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INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT
BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ AND PIP NICHOLSON*
This Article analyzes two seemingly contradictory trends in the study and
practice of law and development. First, it looks at the ever-rising level of
expectations and ambitions about what law can do for development.
Second, it looks at the increasingly vocal criticism and frustration, both
from inside and outside the field, that law often fails to achieve the desired
developmental effects. This Article argues that there is a relationship
between increasing ambition and lack of impact. More particularly, it
suggests that increasing ambition produces limited impacts but that lack of
impact, ironically, leads to recommendations to increase ambition. This
Article concludes that this linked evolution originates first from forces
outside of the law and development domain, such as increasing pressures
on aid efficacy, shifts in developmental paradigms, and increased
geopolitical pressures to bring law into post-conflict states and peacebuilding efforts. The relationship between ambition and lack of impact is
also internal to the field, however. Scholars and practitioners operate
cyclically, criticizing existing practices in order to launch new and often
bolder developments. This Article calls for a break from these cycles, a
return to basic interventions that seek to make incremental improvements
in the functioning of law in the context of development, and a shift from
lofty overarching paradigms that obscure and disappoint, rather than aid,
development.
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INTRODUCTION
Today the field of Law and Development is resurgent. After its selfpronounced death in the early 1970s,1 a simmering existence in the early
1980s,2 and a gradual resurrection in the early 1990s,3 especially with the
World Bank’s discovering of the rule of law as a vital element of its
economic development work,4 the last decade has seen a virtual explosion
of projects and studies5 concerning the improvement of law in developing
countries. Some of this work calls itself “law and development,”6 “law and
economic development,”7 or “law and economic growth.”8 Other terms

1. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (providing the
most influential criticism at the time of how law and development practice and studies were ineffective
and a form of neocolonialism).
2. There are not many studies of law and development in that period. See, e.g., Antony Allott,
Development for What? – False Gods and Holy Writ, 1984 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1; G. W.
Kanyeihamba, The Rule of Law, Judicialism and Development, 1984 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 100;
James C.N. Paul, Law and Development into the ‘90s: Using International Law to Impose
Accountability to People on International Development Actors, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.
3. See, for example, Robert B. Seidman, The Fatal Race: Law-Making and the Implementation
of Development Goals, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 79 and Brian Z. Tamanaha, Review Article:
The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470 (1995) for the first signs of this.
4. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 269
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
5. The body of work undertaken by donors, nongovernmental organizations, and consultants
will, for ease of reference, be called “allied studies” throughout this Article.
6. See, e.g., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (John
Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003).
7. See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note
4.
8. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002).
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used include “legal reform in developing countries,”9 “legal technical
assistance,”10 “rule-of-law promotion,”11 “legal empowerment” for the
poor,12 and enhancing “access to justice” for the poor.13 This Article
defines the field of Law and Development to encompass deliberate efforts
to improve the functioning of law in developing and transitional nations (as
well as studies on how to do so) and the ideas about law in relation to
development that animate such work.14
This Article explains the ways in which law and development has
increased expectations and ambitions even as criticisms and reviews have
concurrently increased questions about the capacity of law and
development initiatives to have their desired impact. This Article argues
that there is a relationship between increasing ambition and lack of impact.
It argues that increasing ambition produces limited impacts but that,
ironically, lack of impact leads to recommendations to increase ambition.
This Article concludes that this linked evolution originates first from forces
outside of the law and development domain, such as increasing pressures
on aid efficacy, shifts in the developmental paradigms, and an increased
geopolitical push to bring law into post-conflict states and peace-building
efforts. The relationship between ambition and lack of impact is also
internal to the field, however. Scholars and practitioners operate cyclically,
criticizing existing practices in order to launch new and often bolder
developments. The field of law and development has expanded in terms of
not only its levels of investment but also the number of people working in
it and its geographical reach. The fundamental goals for law and
development have also changed.

9. See, e.g., LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed.,
2007).
10. See, e.g., Scott Newton, The Dialectics of Law and Development, in THE NEW LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 174, 188.
11. See, e.g., PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas
Carothers ed., 2006).
12. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 161.
13. See, e.g., Michael R. Anderson, Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal
Institutions Responsive to Poor People in LDCs (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 178, 2003).
14. See John Ohnesorge, “Beijing Consensus” Anyone?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 257,
257 (2010) (defining the law and development field “to encompass the activities of legal assistance
providers, as well as the ideas about law, and about development economics, that animate their work”);
David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory
and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 1 (defining law and development as a body of ideas “about law
and economic development that have been employed not just by academics but also by development
practitioners responsible for allocating funds and designing projects”).
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More specifically, this Article argues that since the resurrection of law
and development in the 1990s, there have arisen seven core paradigms,
each of which has expanded the field’s ambitions: Neo-Institutional
Development, Rights-Based Development, Rule of Law, Bottom-Up
Justice, Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional Justice. This
Article demonstrates that with the development of these paradigms, law
and development has moved quickly from seeking to improve legal
education, legal professionalism, and the quality of legislation to much
loftier goals, such as enhancing macroeconomic growth, decreasing income
inequality, providing basic human needs, building the rule of law, ensuring
access to justice for all, empowering the disadvantaged, delivering postconflict justice, and building peace and nations.
The changing conceptualization of development and the role of law in
development has created a challenge for academics, policymakers, and
practitioners, as ever more activities are being categorized as belonging to
the field of law and development even though they actually have different
meanings for different stakeholders. For some, law and development is
chiefly about understanding the causal relationship between law and
macroeconomic growth,15 while for others it is about the actual reform of
legal practices and their developmental impact.16 The conceptualization
also challenges those analyzing causality between law and the broadened
scope of development, whether for evaluative or academic purposes.
While law and development has become increasingly ambitious, the
field has increasingly sought to demonstrate impact. Practitioners and
scholars have sought to demonstrate a causal relationship between law or
legal reform and the formulated goals. This has caused an expansion of
budgets for project evaluations or evaluative research. Moreover, it has led
to the rapid increase in indicators that can be used to connect legal system
reform to aspects of development, many of which have also been
criticized.17
15. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2006); Donald C. Clarke, What Kind of Legal System is Necessary for Economic
Development? The China Puzzle, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra
note 9, at 65; Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008); John K.M. Ohnesorge,
Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian
Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2007).
16. See, e.g., BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4; PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11.
17. See Linn Hammergren, Indices, Indicators and Statistics: A View from the Project Side as to
Their Utility and Pitfalls, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 305 (2011).
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As a result, law and development has set itself up for failure:
expanding its ambition to extremely high levels, while concurrently
increasing the demand for evidence that it can realize these ambitions in the
face of criticism. Given the mismatch between ambition on the one hand
and demonstrated impact and criticism on the other, the question arises:
why has there not been a move toward humbler and more realizable goals?
This Article analyzes the development of ambition and impact both
separately and in terms of the ways in which they interact. It demonstrates
that there is a relationship, or “partial co-evolution,” between rising
ambition and growing attention to and criticism of lack of impact. This
Article finds that the loftier the ideals, the more is invested in measuring
and demonstrating their implementation, which is accompanied by
increasing worry about whether the goals will be achieved. This in turn
stimulates the development of more evaluation and indicators, which, due
to the difficulty of showing causality between the goals and the law, as well
as the impossibility of implementing the goals, results in further doubts
about and dissatisfaction with impact. This creates additional space for
criticizing existing approaches and for propagating new alternatives and,
ironically, generating even more ambitious approaches.
In short, the greater the ambition, the greater the impact analysis; the
greater the impact analysis, the greater the criticism; and then again the
greater the ambition. This Article argues that this “co-evolution” carries
two consequences. First, it produces fads in law and development, which
have followed one another in rapid succession, often without fully
replacing the old practices. Second, it leads to limits on the space for the
use of existing knowledge about the complexities of both developmental
and legal processes.
Part I describes the rise in ambition. Part II details the increasing
worry about and criticism of the impact of the new goals.
I. INCREASING AMBITION IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
PARADIGMS
The first American-led law and development movement occurred in
the 1960s and early 1970s. Based on ideas borrowed from American legal
realists, this movement sought to reform the legal systems of developing
countries intent on constructing liberal states and spreading democracy.18
In the early 1970s, the movement came to an abrupt end following fierce
criticism by the scholars who had originally participated in its projects.
One criticism alleged arrogance and unrealistic ambition: after all, a
18. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1063, 1073–74.
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movement that seeks to change political and legal culture abroad while
lacking sufficient theoretical underpinning and local knowledge is clearly
overly ambitious.19
It is therefore all the more surprising to see the field resurgent less
than two decades later. Further, this reincarnation is not humble but is
rather law and development “on steroids,” seeking to effect many types of
development through law and legal reform. It reaches far beyond the realm
of the original American law and development movement. This rapid
expansion of the field is best captured by analyzing the seven core
paradigms that have emerged and that now inform law and development:
Neo-Institutional Development, Rights-Based Development, Rule of Law,
Bottom-Up Justice, Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional
Justice.
A. Neo-institutional Development and Rights-Based Development
Development refocused on law in the 1980s when certain ideas about
the role of institutions for economic growth emerged. With the rise of
neoliberalism and its focus on markets, neo-institutional scholars saw legal
institutions (most notably enforceable contracts and secure property rights)
as key to fostering economic growth.20 A market-friendly legal system that
allows minimal interference from the state was seen as a prerequisite for
economic growth.21 These economic conceptions of the role of law entered
the development field through ideas such as “good governance” and “the
rule of law,” which at the time were defined primarily in terms of market
facilitation.22
Meanwhile, the concept of development itself expanded and moved
away from a singular focus on macroeconomic growth towards an
emphasis on broader socioeconomic needs. Especially with the emergence
of the “human development” approach in the 1980s, development came to
mean more than economic growth or income equality.23 For instance:

19. See id. at 1090; Trubek & Santos, supra note 14, at 6.
20. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3–10 (1990) (discussing the influence of societal institutions on economic change);
Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction, 17 WORLD DEV.
1319 (1989) (assesing the historical impact of institutions and institutional frameworks in the
development of economies).
21. Santos, supra note 4, at 268.
22. David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 74, 85.
23. KATIE WILLIS, THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF DEVELOPMENT 6–8 (2005); Des Gasper, Human
Rights, Human Needs, Human Development, Human Security: Relationships Between Four
International “Human” Discourses 19 (Inst. of Soc. Studies, Working Paper No. 20/07, 2007).
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[The human development approach] stresses the lack of adequate
connection between levels of monetised activity and levels of wellbeing: there are many other determinants of well-being, and frequently
weak or unreliable or perverse links to well-being from economic
growth.24

Even the World Bank, a strong proponent of economic growth,
incorporated social concerns into its Comprehensive Development
Framework in 1999.25 The rise of the human rights movement offered yet
another approach to development beyond that of macroeconomic growth,
grounded in individualism and focusing on the rights of the poor,26 under
which development is “a process of expanding the real freedoms that
people enjoy.”27 Elemental to the concept of development as freedom is
the emphasis on the physical security of persons, as well as a person’s
“ability to secure and hold basic goods.”28 Law became a key factor in
securing the protection of rights and freedom through development.
Moreover, the increasing momentum of the human rights movement and
the recognition that the protection of internationally-recognized human
rights required domestic legal reforms brought law and development back
to the fore.29
Broadening development objectives and consequent changing
expectations have resulted in ever greater ambition for the role of law in
development as a way to increase macroeconomic growth and to decrease
inequality, improve sustainable development, strengthen freedom and
rights protection, and empower the disadvantaged across the globe.
B. Rule of Law
In the 1990s, the “rule of law” emerged as a central concept in

24. Gasper, supra note 23, at 19.
25. Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL,
supra note 4, at 203, 203–04; Santos, supra note 4, at 253, 268, 275.
26. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (placing the individual at
the center of development and identifying individual freedoms as the most effective means for
enhancing development and reducing poverty); Paul Gready & Jonathan Ensor, Introduction, in
REINVENTING DEVELOPMENT?: TRANSLATING RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES FROM THEORY INTO
PRACTICE 1, 1–6 (Paul Gready & Jonathan Ensor eds., 2005) (summarizing the second revolution in
human rights, during which these rights began to be seen as existing beyond narrow legalistic terms and
also became part of a broader, “rights-based” approach to development).
27. SEN, supra note 26, at 3.
28. Gasper, supra note 23, at 21.
29. Trubek, supra note 22, at 84.
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development.30 The rule of law became so popular because it uniquely
bridged the neo-institutional and human rights ideas that had dominated the
development policies of Western and international donors in the early
1990s.31 The rule of law became in particular a key concept of the World
Bank’s good governance agenda, which allowed the Bank to move beyond
its original economic mandate into the area of substantial policy and
politics.32
With the adoption of the rule of law as the major law and development
paradigm, a complex and sometimes conflicting set of ambitious goals
entered the field. Originally, the World Bank chiefly used a thin, trimmed
down conceptualization of rule of law33 that focused on procedure.34 This
conceptualization was based on the following tenets: there is a set of rules
that are known in advance; the rules are in force; mechanisms exist to
ensure the proper application of the rules, and any departure from the rules
has to follow established procedures; conflicts in the application of the
rules can be resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial
body; and there are procedures for amending rules that no longer serve
their purpose.35 In its 1994 approach, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), in contrast, used a “thicker” conceptualization that

30. Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN
SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 3, 3 (“One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these
days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles.”).
31. Trubek, supra note 22, at 84–85.
32. Santos, supra note 4, at 269–70.
33. Much contention exists, both in academia as well as among practitioners, about the definition
of the “rule of law.” Scholars distinguish between thick and thin conceptualizations of the rule of law.
The thick conceptualization views the rule of law as necessarily comprising “certain universal moral
principles, inherently liberal in character,” such as freedom and equality. Thom Ringer, Note,
Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the
“Rule of Law” and Its Place in Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
178, 190 (2007) (footnote omitted). This conceptualization is also associated with constitutional
protection of the rights to vote, to political equality, and to private property. CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 7 (2001); Ringer, supra, at 191. Critics of such a
thick conceptualization argue that the rule of law “is not to be confused with democracy, justice,
equality . . . human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man.” JOSEPH RAZ,
The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 211
(2d ed. 2009). This criticism is ultimately based on the idea that “[i]f the rule of law means everything,
does it still mean anything?” Ringer, supra, at 193. Scholars have, in response, developed a thin
conceptualization of the rule of law, which stresses the predictability and rationality of rules, distilling
out any moral content or preference about political institutions beyond the realm of law. Id. Critics of
such attempts claim that this moral distillation is futile, as the thin conceptualization of the rule of law
still contains moral choices about the kind of law and legal system that is best. Id. at 195 (citing
MICHAEL NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICIZING ETHICS 13–14 (2002)).
34. Santos, supra note 4, at 270.
35. Id.
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incorporated political and civil human rights and elements of a
constitutional democracy.36
The two conceptualizations subsequently converged, as exemplified
by the World Bank’s adoption of a broader approach to rights-based
development and rule of law. For example, the Bank stated that “a well
functioning legal and judicial system is critical both as an end in itself as
well as a means to facilitate and leverage the achievement of other
development objectives.”37 The Bank’s current usage of the term “rule of
law” includes different versions of the concept that “converge in a hodgepodge articulation.”38 One such usage highlights the rule of law’s
importance for securing the social dimension of development, which, from
the 1990s onwards, was increasingly seen as crucial.39 While originally the
concept of the rule of law was seen as a means, through the protection of
rights, to enhance the market and ensure that basic needs were met, it
increasingly came to be seen as part of a wider concept of the development
goal of good governance.40
The Rule of Law paradigm crucially expanded the field of law and
development, as it offered an integrated and comprehensive paradigm to
guide law and development efforts away from singular, project-like
interventions towards a broader transformative agenda. Seeking to
establish rule of law, whether as a means to development or as an end in
itself and whether using “thin” or “thick” conceptualizations, necessarily
entails a series of complex and multi-level interventions that are often
based on legal normative goals, such as fundamentally changing the
relationship between law and politics and institutionalizing professionalism
and law enforcement. These goals are frequently implemented in a topdown manner and are largely developed in a different context from the one
in which they are applied; they are thus not adapted to local conditions.
Such expansion of the rule of law paradigm is highly ambitious, not least
36. Ringer, supra note 33, at 192–93.
37. LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM
5 (2004).
38. Santos, supra note 4, at 276.
39. See Rittich, supra note 25, at 203 (describing the incorporation of social concerns into “the
mainstream agenda of market reform and economic development”); Santos, supra note 4, at 268
(detailing the World Bank’s move, in response to criticism of its macroeconomic growth-focused
structural adjustment programs, to make poverty reduction a central issue and to “focus on structural,
social, and human concerns”). The rule of law was also regarded as critical in the fight against
corruption, which the World Bank started in 1996. See Santos, supra note 4, at 273–75 (“In 1996, the
[World] Bank announced its determination to begin projects aimed at fighting corruption . . . .”).
40. See Rittich, supra note 25, at 209–10 (noting that international financial institutions have
started to promote “increasingly comprehensive notions of good governance in a globally integrated
economy” and that in the light of this new focus, legal reform has become central).
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because its different objectives can be inherently conflicting: for instance
there can be tensions between the rule of law’s goals of establishing law
and order and binding the government to law.41
C. Bottom-Up Justice
The increasing focus on the relief of micro-level poverty and rightsbased development resulted in criticism of existing law and development
programs for failing to focus on aspects of law that mattered directly in the
lives of the poor and the weak.42 Out of this criticism emerged the BottomUp Justice paradigm, which focuses on the legal needs of the poor and the
disadvantaged. Using terms such as “access to justice,”43 “justice for the
poor,”44 “justice for all,”45 “legal empowerment,”46 “legal empowerment of
the poor,”47 and “microjustice,”48 proponents have sought to develop a
range of legal interventions that will have a more direct effect on the
development of marginalized people.
Major international development organizations such as the UNDP and
the World Bank have made access to justice central to their law-related
programming. The UNDP’s access to justice approach, which “support[s]
justice and related systems so that they work for those who are poor and

41. See Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 54 (discussing the multiple goals of the
rule of law and their inherent conflicts).
42. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 105; Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Ruleof-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note
11, at 75 (arguing that law “cannot be detached from its social and political environment”).
43. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, PRACTICE NOTE: ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004),
available
at
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democraticgovernance/dg-publications-for-website/access-to-justice-practice-note/Justice_PN_En.pdf [hereinafter
ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, PROGRAMMING FOR JUSTICE: ACCESS FOR
ALL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2005),
available
at
http://asiapacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/democratic_governance/RBA
P-DG-2005-Programming-for-Justice.pdf; Anderson, supra note 13.
44. See, e.g., Justice for the Poor, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/ZRKELPETD0 (last
updated Dec. 11, 2013).
45. See,
e.g.,
Justice
for
All,
ASIAN
DEV.
BANK
(Jan.
31,
2009),
http://www.adb.org/features/justice-all.
46. See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula, Legal Empowerment to Secure Land Rights – Defining the
Concept, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN
AFRICA 7 (Lorenzo Cotula & Paul Mathieu eds., 2008); Golub, supra note 12.
47. See, e.g., 1 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR
EVERYONE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR 3 (2008).
48. See, e.g., MAURITS BARENDRECHT & PATRICIA VAN NISPEN, MICROJUSTICE (Tilburg Law &
Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2008-010, 2008).
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disadvantaged,”49 is based in the idea that “access to justice is a basic
human right as well as an indispensable means to combat poverty, prevent
and resolve conflicts.”50 The approach explicitly recognizes that justice
systems can be found in both formal state institutions and informal nonstate normative systems.51 The World Bank’s “Justice for the Poor”
program is similar:
Justice for the Poor (J4P) is an attempt by the World Bank to grapple
with some of the theoretical and practical challenges of promoting justice
sector reform in a number of countries in Africa (Kenya and Sierra
Leone) and East Asia (Indonesia and Cambodia). J4P reflects an
understanding of the need for demand-oriented, community-driven
approach to justice and governance reform, which values the
perspectives of the users, particularly the poor and marginalized such as
women, youth and ethnic minorities.52

These two approaches augment the existing paradigm of the rule of law,
thus expanding the scope of law and development efforts to address the
needs of the poor.
A second category, “legal empowerment,” can be defined as “the use
of legal services, often in combination with related development activities,
to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives.”53 Legal
empowerment offers an antidote to “the problematic, state-centric rule-oflaw orthodoxy” and enables law to operate as a mechanism for instituting
“broader socioeconomic development initiatives.”54 Such empowerment
occurs
when the poor, their supporters, or governments—employing legal and
other means—create rights, capacities, and/or opportunities for the poor
that give them new power to use law and legal tools to escape poverty
and marginalization. Empowerment is a process, an end in itself, and a
means of escaping poverty.55

Legal empowerment approaches thus take the ambition of Bottom-Up
49. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. JUSTICE
FOR
THE
POOR
PROGRAM
1
(2006),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/J4POverviewDecember06.pdf.
53. Golub, supra note 12, at 161.
54. Id.
55. JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: FROM CONCEPTS TO
ASSESSMENT 29 (2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM500.pdf.
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Justice a step further as they seek not only to adapt law in the broadest
sense to the needs of the poor but also, through legal intervention, to
empower the poor to have control over their lives and to capitalize on their
informal properties.
Under this approach, law faces high expectations as a means to deal
directly with poverty.56 The poor have especially limited access to legal
institutions, and a state of “lawlessness” has an adverse impact on them.57
Nevertheless, legal empowerment has helped alleviate poverty.58
Bottom-Up Justice practitioners and scholars have conducted an indepth analysis of the diverse problems and challenges that need to be
overcome to promote justice and legal empowerment for the poor and the
weak, leading to a comprehensive and ambitious agenda for law and
development that in practice adds to the already lofty ambitions of rule of
law building.59 The particular challenges that this approach must
overcome, including pervasive social and institutional practices such as
corruption, gender bias, low legal awareness, lack of trust in formal
institutions, and corruptive patron-client networks, are of the highest level
of difficulty.60
Most Bottom-Up Justice efforts are at least partially directed at
enhancing legal awareness through education and rights awareness
training; improving legal aid to the poor through the provision of legal
clinics, public interest lawyers, and paralegals; developing alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms; supporting local dispute resolution
institutions that already exist; and strengthening civil society in general.61
This approach is most likely to be successful if conducted in a participatory
manner that involves poor and weak stakeholders. It should be based on
their needs and preferences, although these are inevitably framed and
interpreted by donors or their consultants,62 whose perception of
56. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 4 (“Access to justice is a vital part of the UNDP
mandate to reduce poverty and strengthen democratic governance. Within the broad context of justice
reform, UNDP’s specific niche lies in supporting justice and related systems so that they work for those
who are poor and disadvantaged.”).
57. Anderson, supra note 13, at 1–3.
58. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 17–
19 (2000) (reviewing the role of legal empowerment in reducing poverty in the Philippines and
Bangladesh); Golub, supra note 12, at 163, 166–68.
59. See, e.g., Benjamin van Rooij, Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal Development
Cooperation, 4 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 286 (2012) (discussing the rise of bottom-up approaches and
questioning their innovativeness and feasibility).
60. Id.
61. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 10–12; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 11–14;
Golub, supra note 12, at 165.
62. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 85; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 22; Golub,
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stakeholder needs may diverge substantially from that of the stakeholders
themselves.
The Bottom-Up Justice approaches suggest several methods for
achieving their goals. For instance, several Bottom-Up Justice programs
and studies call for “mainstreaming” legal sector activities: making them
central to other sectors of development work, both in recipient countries as
well as in donor institutions.63 Further, several studies have shown that
bottom-up approaches require time and that tight project cycles and an
overly large portfolio of programs should therefore be avoided.64 If
possible, solutions should not be based on transplants of existing models
but should rather be tailored to local realities.65 Finally, it is important to
garner sufficient support for planned reforms and to overcome capture and
undue influence by vested interests.66
At face value, targeted interventions, such as legal awareness building,
paralegal training, or development of ADR mechanisms, might seem less
difficult than the broader agenda of building the rule of law. Even specific
interventions can become highly complex, however, when tried over a
larger scale and when faced with problems, such as corruption, social bias,
and lack of trust, that are deeply embedded within sociopolitical structures
and not easily changed. In addition, if Bottom-Up Justice is ultimately
about empowerment and changing existing power asymmetries, a
seemingly boundless aspirational agenda emerges. Moreover, there is a
problem of scale with a bottom-up strategy. How does one work bottomup but still reach sufficient populations within countries or regions? A true
bottom-up approach requires large investments in gathering and
incorporating local knowledge into locally adapted projects. This may
limit the broader impact of such an approach, especially if it is to be
achieved solely through a civil society that still needs to be built. Finally,
many of the goals cannot be achieved without a reasonably well
functioning state and legal apparatus. Continued efforts under the rule of
law paradigm are thus required.
D. Customary Justice
Once the Bottom-Up Justice approach was established, scholars and
supra note 12, at 167–68.
63. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 120–21; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 10;
Golub, supra note 12, at 170, 174–76.
64. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 10–11; Golub, supra note 12, at 170.
65. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 96; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 9; Golub,
supra note 12, at 164.
66. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 79–80; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 8.
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practitioners realized that perhaps a focus on formal legal systems was too
narrow. In the lives of marginalized people, state law plays only a minor
role, while customary justice systems govern most social and economic
issues and are thus crucial for pro-poor development. From this conclusion
arose the fifth law and development paradigm, Customary Justice, with
which law and development moved into the realm of non-state law and
openly admitted the plurality of legal systems.
By the early 1990s, there was a recognition that customary justice
systems could not be eradicated or ignored.67 Non-state normative systems
are important because of their proximity to the poor and other identifiable
groups (for example, entrepreneurs in Vietnam)68 and the fact that the
world’s poor most often live in settings regulated by customary law and
traditional authorities.69
In some countries up to 80% of the population lives under non-state
normative systems and has little contact with state law.70 These figures are
supported by estimates that customary law “governs the daily lives of more
than three-quarters of the populations of most African countries”;71 for
instance, “up to 90 percent of cases in Nigeria are settled by customary
courts.”72 Further, such non-state law and governance institutions are much
more accessible for the poor: geographically, liguistically, and culturally.73
Moreover, in practice, customary law also influences the operation of and

67. See, e.g., 1 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, supra note 46, at 25 (arguing
that most of the poor often resort to or have to resort to informal legal institutions); DEP’T FOR INT’L
DEV., BRIEFING: NON-STATE JUSTICE AND SECURITY SYSTEMS 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ101.pdf; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 8 (stating that the
poor sometimes prefer traditional justice systems over formal ones); EWA WOJKOWSKA, DOING
JUSTICE: HOW INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS CAN CONTRIBUTE 5 (2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EwaWojkowska.pdf.
68. See generally JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A
“RULE OF LAW” IN VIETNAM (2006); Quan Hien Nguyen, Social Structures of Contracts: A Case Study
of the Vietnamese Market (Mar. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne), available
at http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/313.
69. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 101; Golub, supra note 42, at 116;
Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Poor Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of
Customary and Informal Justice Systems in Africa, in 2 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW,
EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 141 (Ana Palacio et al. eds., 2006); Gordon R. Woodman, Customary
Law in Common Law Systems, IDS BULL., Jan. 2001, at 29.
70. WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 12.
71. Odinkalu, supra note 69, at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 144.
73. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 100–02; THE WORLD BANK, VILLAGE
JUSTICE IN INDONESIA: CASE STUDIES ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VILLAGE DEMOCRACY AND
GOVERNANCE 27, 49 (2004).
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affects reforms to the state legal system.74 Finally, non-state conduct
norms may provide a foundation for nascent commercial activity.75
Informal networks play a vital role in enabling economic activities, both in
developmental settings where state institutions for the enforcement of
contracts are not in place and in modern economies in which some contend
that informal arrangements “are the chief building blocks of sustainable
economic relationships.”76 All of this makes engaging with customary and
other non-state law a necessary endeavor for law and development
practitioners.77
Law and development reformers have identified several traits of nonstate law that may stand in the way of development. Core issues include
elite capture,78 human rights protection (especially for women and
marginalized members within the customary community),79 and the lack of
integration of non-state arrangements into wider capital markets.80 The
challenge, however, is to determine how to deal with these issues: how to
influence the functioning of customary and non-state justice systems
without undermining their accessibility and proximity, for example. Some
propose to do so through legal aid, human rights dialogues with elders, and
community-based programs that raise legal awareness,81 but most have

74. Laura Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and Future Look at Law and Development, in 2
THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 69, at 87.
75. Nguyen, supra note 68, at 39 (arguing that relational business practices are “deeply embedded
in the institutional matrix of the market” and that the negotiation of contracts does not take place in the
shadow of the law).
76. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Legal Institutions and Informal Networks,
18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 40, 41 (2006).
77. Julio Faundez, Should Justice Reform Projects Take Non-State Justice Systems Seriously?
Perspectives from Latin America, in 2 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 69, at 113.
78. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 73, at 4; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43,
at 101, 103.
79. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 102–03; Ann Whitehead & Dzodzi
Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women’s Land Rights in Sub-saharan Africa: The Implications of the Return to the Customary, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 102 (2003); Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law
and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice Systems 4 (Jul. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/4773831118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf.
80. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6–7 (2001) (arguing that the the fact that the poor’s property is
regulated by informal and customary institutions excludes them from access to capital markets and thus
keeps them poor).
81. See Janine Ubink & Benjamin van Rooij, Towards Customary Legal Empowerment: An
Introduction, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 7 (Janine Ubink ed.,
Int’l Dev. Law Org., Legal and Governance Reform: Lessons Learned No. 3, 2011), available at
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/312000/1/CustomaryJustice3.pdf.
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sought, through more sweeping legal reforms, to integrate customary and
non-state justice systems into the broader framework of state law, thus
creating an external check on those systems.82
Successful integration is highly ambitious, as it entails finding a way
to steer existing cultural and political practices that are embedded in local
tradition, knowledge, and power relations and that are by their unwritten
nature not accessible to outsiders. It also challenges state law, which must
find a way to bridge two fundamentally different systems that may have
different languages, procedures, substantive norms, and underlying
sociopolitical historical contexts. This challenge has existed around the
globe for centuries, as indigenous peoples have sought recognition for their
laws in, for example, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.83 Codifying
custom into state law can be difficult, as doing so may affect the fluidity,
informality, and accessibility of norms84 and also typically demands that
choices between different versions of customary law, which may favor
some while excluding others, be made.85
Incorporation of non-state adjudicative bodies into the state legal
sector is also challenging, as it does not automatically improve the
procedural fairness of such institutions or increase their effectiveness in
protecting human rights and weak groups. Extra measures are necessary to
legally oblige traditional authorities to respect human rights and to comply
with certain procedures and also to make sure that justice seekers can
challenge infringements of these rules—through appeals to state courts, the
results of which are then enforced in the local community, for instance.
Nevertheless, this integration may only have a limited effect on the
problems involved in using non-state law for development.86 Unless
82. Several ways of integrating or combining state and non-state law—including full
incorporation, limited incorporation, and coexistence—have been proposed. See WOJKOWSKA, supra
note 67, at 25–29 (providing a useful overview of the different options and forms of such integration, or
“linkages,” of state and non-state law). Under full incorporation the non-state law is “given a formal
role within the formal state justice system.” Id. at 26. State law incorporates non-state law through, for
instance, codification, a restatement of non-state norms, the incorporation of customary courts into the
formal state structure, or the establishment of special branches of local courts to deal with customary
cases. Id. at 25–29.
83. See generally P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORY
OF SOVEREIGNTY, STATUS, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (2004).
84. Ubink & van Rooij, supra note 81, at 12.
85. Martin Chanock, Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family
Law Reform, 3 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 72 (1989).
86. Erman Rajagukguk, Legal Pluralism and the Three-Cornered Case Study of Women’s
Inheritance Rights Changing in Lombok, in LEGITIMACY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW
AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED 213, 230 (David K. Linnan ed., 2012) (arguing that there is no
coherent integration of adat laws and Islamic law relevant to women’s inheritance into the secular laws
in Lombok).

VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

6/30/2014 3:27 PM

313

customary norms have been codified, which is itself problematic, state
judges may find it difficult to locate and apply the appropriate customary
norm, especially if, for example, disputes arise as a result of large
economic and social changes in the local community.87 In some countries,
such as Ghana, customary or traditional law judges rely largely on case law
developed by state judges in earlier decisions.88 Norms derived from case
law, however, may not fit the “living” norms observed in the community.89
Judges who do not use case law must rely on expert witnesses or assessors,
who are allowed to define the appropriate norm from a body of fluid,
sometimes contradictory, unwritten rules.90 The integration of state and
non-state law in state courts is thus highly difficult and can easily lead to
situations in which either court decisions are divorced from local realities
and thus have limited impact or courts strengthen existing elites, who tend
to assume a dominant role in the provision of information about contested
norms.91
With the rise of Customary Justice, law and development abandoned
indirect methods of improving legal systems, such as encouraging the
expansion of institutions and rights and enabling citizens to invoke such
rights, and ambitiously sought to directly influence deeply set social norms
and cultural practices without destroying their positive characteristics.
Consequently, it had to contend with the immense complexities of
unwritten legal systems that are fluid, contested, and deeply embedded in
local power structures, cultural practices, and local knowledge. The
emergent Customary Justice paradigm added yet another layer of ambition

87. See Janine Ubink, The Quest for Customary Law in African State Courts, in THE FUTURE OF
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 83, 91 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how customary
norms became contested in Ghana when land value increased and chiefs and villagers had different
ideas about who should reap the profits from this).
88. JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW, LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE
ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 190 (2008).
89. Id. at 188.
90. Ubink, supra note 87, at 93. The complex nature of customary law itself also renders the
discovery of the appropriate norms difficult, even with the assistance of reliable and knowledgeable
witnesses and assessors. First and foremost, what methodology should be used for determining what
constitutes “living law”? Is it, for instance, appropriate to simply ask traditional leaders or experts what
the norm is? Or, alternatively, should assessors look, where possible, at which norms have been applied
in previous conflicts? Or should they study which norms are in fact observed in everyday life? If one
follows the legal anthropological literature, the latter two options would work best to find the actual
“living law.” UBINK, supra note 88, at 219–20. They require, however, a great amount of time and
effort. Customary norms have also increasingly become contested as a result of circumstances of
“change, conflict and imposition; especially when the rights and duties of traditional authorities are part
of the debate.” Id. In these cases, establishing which norm is used to solve disputes or is the observed
norm in daily life is very difficult, if not impossible. Id.
91. Ubink & van Rooij, supra note 81, at 14.
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to the paradigms discussed previously. Law and development became an
endeavour to promote social and economic development in the broadest
terms, build rule of law, enhance access to justice, empower the weak and
the poor, and successfully improve the functioning of customary justice
systems despite their tenets being contested.
E. Post-Conflict State-Building and Transitional Justice
Law and development further expanded its ambitions with the
emergence of the Post-Conflict State-Building and Transitional Justice
paradigms. These paradigms were developed during the 1990s as nations
increasingly questioned what to do with countries that emerged from war or
major internal conflicts.92
Law and building the rule of law in particular were considered crucial
elements for stability and development. According to a consensus among
international policymakers, the introduction of the rule of law should
ideally be the basis for post-conflict reconstruction and democratization.93
Bernard Kouchner, the senior UN official in Kosovo, famously stated that
the single “most important lesson to be learned from Kosovo . . . is that
peacekeeping missions need a judicial or a law-and-order ‘kit’ made up of
trained police officers, judges and prosecutors, plus a set of potentially
draconian security laws or regulations that are available upon their
arrival.”94 Similarly, Lord Ashdown, the High Representative for Bosnia
and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006, summarized his experience by stating
that the focus of a peacekeeping mission must be on the rule of law rather
than on democracy “[b]ecause without the former, the latter is soon
undermined.”95 The 2000 Brahimi panel report on UN peace operations
also provided that “[t]hese missions’ tasks would have been much easier if
a common United Nations Justice package had allowed them to apply an
interim legal code to which mission personnel could have been pre-trained
while the final answer to the ‘applicable law’ question was being worked
out.”96
The original Rule of Law paradigm thus became part of a broader and

92. They were also developed as nations were faced with generally fragile states that were not in
a post-conflict period, a situation not discussed in detail here. See Francis Fukuyama, The Imperative of
State-Building, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 17 (2004) (providing a general rationale for state-building).
93. David Chandler, The Problems of “Nation-Building”: Imposing Bureaucratic “Rule from
Above,” 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 577, 580 (2004).
94. Ash Ü. Bâli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in
Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 454 (2005).
95. Chandler, supra note 93, at 579.
96. Id.
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much stronger and better-funded Post-Conflict State-Building paradigm,
which has grown rapidly as both the UN and the United States have
expanded their roles as post-conflict administrators and peace-, state-, and
nation-builders over the last two decades. Compared to prior UN missions
that exercised executive power in West Guinea (1962–63), Cambodia
(1992–93), and Eastern Slavonia (1996–98), the missions in Kosovo
(1999–present)97 and Timor-Leste (East Timor) (1999–present)98 have
exercised much broader powers and for the first time have become
responsible for the full judicial power within these jurisdictions.99
Nation-building (the broader version of state-building that includes
constructing a national identity and replacing existing institutions)100 has
become part of the war prevention agenda of the United States as that
country has aggressively sought to reconstruct regimes that might pose it a
threat.101 Thus, the preventive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan marked a fullfledged effort at nation-building in which establishing the rule of law came
to be seen as a central element.102 The U.S. strategy of nation-building and
conducting preventive wars seeks to make these countries more favorable
and less threatening to U.S. security and economic interests.103 The United
States could not achieve these goals merely by toppling a regime, a state
administration, and the administration of law; it had to assume
responsibility for order and justice.104
Building states and nations requires building law, and law and
development has become part and parcel of the most ambitious modern
efforts at social transformation. Post-conflict rule of law projects are
97. In Kosovo most law-related powers were assigned to the EULEX program in 2008. Rule of
Law Liaison Office, UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMIN. MISSION KOS., http://www.unmikonline.org/
Pages/rollo.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2012).
98. This was actually a consecutive series of missions, the last of which was mandated in 2006
following turmoil in Timor-Leste. UNMIT Background, UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN
TIMOR-LESTE, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/background.shtml (last visited
Sept. 3, 2012).
99. Simon Chesterman, Rough Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Territories,
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 70, 94 (2005).
100. Bâli, supra note 94, at 436.
101. Kevin Green, Attacking Without Provocation; Maintaining a Subsequent Occupation; All for
the Sake of Democratization: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Preventive War and Post-Conflict
Nation-Building, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 509, 518–19 (2009); John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan,
Toward Postconflict Reconstruction, WASH. Q., Autumn 2002, at 83, 85.
102. See Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 159
(“A lot now rides on our ability not just to win wars but to help create self-sustaining democratic
political institutions and robust market-oriented economies . . . .”).
103. Green, supra note 101, at 519.
104. SETH G. JONES ET AL., ESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER AFTER CONFLICT xii (2005),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG374.pdf.

VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

316

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/30/2014 3:27 PM

[Vol 24:297

carried out in the most difficult areas, which have long histories of conflict,
state failure, and limited knowledge of or familiarity with the rule of law as
defined by Western organizations.105 Additionally, as in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the project developers are often part of the same organization
that invaded and occupied the country and destroyed the political and legal
institutions that are then restored and even improved according to Western
liberal, constitutional, and democratic ideals, which have no local roots.106
Further, reconstruction efforts may attract robust criticism, for example
when they project Western rule of law into an Islamic law-based state.107
To successfully contribute to state- and nation-building in fragile and
post-conflict contexts is one of law’s most ambitious goals yet. This is
especially true in a transnational exercise where one nation-state or
international body occupies a foreign territory, wholly or partly suspending
local sovereignty:
[D]epending on the conditions pertaining in the relevant territory prior to
the intervention, nation-building may quite literally require the creation
of a national identity, if no such preexisting shared identity unites the
territory.
External nation-builders must assume core state
responsibilities, including the provision of security and the exercise of
political authority for the duration of the intervention. At its most
ambitious, external nation-building seeks to replace existing local
institutions with new ones, often designed by foreign experts and
imposed from above.108

Meanwhile, during the 1990s, a Transitional Justice paradigm
emerged and has sought to combine justice with peace through diverse,
multi-level approaches, including amnesty, criminal and customary justice
tribunals, and truth and reconciliation commissions. An influential
overview of transitional justice, developed by the UN in 2004, states that
methods “may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual

105. PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITION AND
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 39 (2006).
106. See Bâli, supra note 94, at 435–36 (describing, in the context of the U.S. and UK occupations
of Iraq, the salient features of many nation-building efforts, including the creation of a national identity
and the replacement of local institutions).
107. See, e.g., Tarak Abdallah, Economy and Society: A Qur’anic Perspective, in LEGITIMACY,
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED, supra note 86, at
137, 148; Cyndi Banks, Note, Reconstructing Justice in Iraq: Promoting the Rule of Law in a PostConflict State, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 155, 160 (2010).
108. Bâli, supra note 94, at 436.
TO
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prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and
dismissals, or a combination thereof.”109 Under the Transitional Justice
paradigm, state and non-state law are to fulfill complex functions,
including consolidating peace; ensuring remembrance of past atrocities;
and ensuring restorative, retributive, and distributive justice, all in postconflict contexts.110 To bolster many transitional justice goals, truth
commissions can “help establish the truth, provide redress for victims,
ensure accountability for perpetrators, identify and stimulate reforms and
preventative effects, promote reconciliation, and create formal distance
with the past.”111
Transitional Justice has really taken off, as is evidenced by the
expansion of truth commissions; local, regional, and international postconflict tribunals; and increased financial support. According to one study,
5% of development aid to Rwanda and Guatamala between 1995 and 2005
was dedicated to supporting transitional justice projects.112
With the State-Building and Transitional Justice paradigms, law and
development has moved into its most ambitious phase. The key challenge
is finding ways to enable law to foster development in situations in which
law has been non-existent or highly unjust and major supporting
conditions, such as safety, a basic functioning of the state, and trust in state
institutions, are lacking. As State-Building and Transitional Justice require
Law and Progress, Rule of Law, Bottom-Up Justice, and Customary Justice
to function together, all of the paradigms converge here, resulting in
limitless ambition.
II. QUESTIONS ABOUT AND CRITICISM OF THE IMPACT OF LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT
After over sixty years of international developmental aid, there is
doubt about the effectiveness of law and development.113 Especially with

109. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
110. Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence, 3 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28, 37–45 (2009).
111. Max du Plessis & Jolyon Ford, Transitional Justice: A Future Truth Commission for
Zimbabwe?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 85 (2009).
112. Roger Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 292, 302 (2008).
113. See, e.g., Paul Clements et al., Reducing World Poverty by Improving Evaluation of
Development Aid, 29 AM. J. EVALUATION 195, 195 (2008); Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam,
The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results of 40 Years of Research, 23 J. ECON. SURVS. 433,
433 (2009) (“The mix of casual evidence and the absence of a correlation between aid and growth have
caused many to doubt the effectiveness of aid.”); William Easterly & Claudia R. Williamson, Rhetoric
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the global economic downturn and the development of nationalist anti-aid
politics in donor countries,114 the lack of demonstrable impact could
undermine continued aid spending and support. Donors, operators, and
recipients are increasingly under pressure to demonstrate effectiveness.115
Consequently, the aid community has paid more attention to defining,
evaluating, and improving impact, agreeing on the need for indicators116 if
not on the best method of measuring impact. The 2005 Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action represent
broad commitments to the impact of development aid.117
A new industry of evaluators, evaluation designers, and related
academic scholars has arisen to address this key issue.118 The Development
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD/DAC) has developed criteria for evaluation that most
donors use as a common basis, despite differences in actual evaluation
practices.119 Aid impact evaluation has moved from a focus on outcomes
and impacts at a project level to impact evaluation at policy, strategy,
country, and regional levels.120 At the same time, a whole range of
indicators that can be used to study correlations of key variables (or their

Versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices, 39 WORLD DEV. 1930, 1930 (2011)
(“Despite the transfer of over $4.6 trillion (measured in constant 2007 dollars) in gross official
development assistance (ODA) to developing countries from 1960 through 2008, a substantial amount
of the world remains in extreme poverty and stagnant growth.”); Elizabeth M. King & Jere R. Behrman,
Timing and Duration of Exposure in Evaluations of Social Programs, 24 WORLD BANK RES.
OBSERVER 55, 55 (2009).
114. This debate has played out in Australia, for example, where both conservative and Labor
governments have reduced and delayed commitments to spend 0.5 % of GDP on foreign aid. David
Wroe, Coalition Takes Axe to Foreign Aid, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.
smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/coalition-takes-axe-to-foreign-aid-20130905-2t89c.
html.
115. King & Behrman, supra note 113, at 55–56.
116. Juan Carlos Botero et al., Indices and Indicators of Justice, Governance, and the Rule of Law:
An Overview, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 153, 153 (2011).
117. Camille Cameron & Sally Low, Aid-Effectiveness and Donor Coordination from Paris to
Busan: A Cambodian Case Study, LAW & DEV. REV., Dec. 2012, at 166, 170, 172–73 (describing the
Paris Declaration as “an agreement to forge a ‘genuine partnership, with developing countries clearly in
charge of their own development processes’” and noting that the Accra Agenda “calls for a focus shift
from aid effectiveness to development outcomes”).
118. Hammergren, supra note 17, at 307.
119. MARTA FORESTI ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., SÉRIE NOTES MÉTHODOLOGIQUES NO. 1, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EVALUATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 8
(2007); see also Jim Parsons et al., Justice Indicators for Post-conflict Settings: A Review, 2 HAGUE J.
ON RULE L. 203 (2010) (discussing more generally work on justice indicators, which is also developing
apace).
120. FORESTI ET AL., supra note 119, at 8.
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proxies) with various forms of development has emerged.121 Law and
development as an increasingly prominent part of the development field
has not escaped the pressure to demonstrate its effectiveness:
Despite—or because of—the magnitude of the public and private funds
being spent on rule of law promotion, its effectiveness continues to be
questioned: by scholars, practitioners, donor and host country politicians
and media.
Many donors have responded to this internal and external critique by
investing heavily in mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating their
projects and programs . . . .122

Thus the field of law and development has not just expanded its
ambition but has also become increasingly worried about the impact of law
on development. Ironically, this “industry” focus on indicators can itself
delay or preclude local agencies from establishing their own evaluative
processes.123 The remainder of this section examines what is known about
the impact of law and development in its ever-growing realms, analyzing
the relationship between law and development generally, taking up the
issues in the section on neo-institutional and rights-based development and
then considering the other five core paradigms. It considers various
criticisms of each paradigm, noting the ways in which such criticisms, in
addition to the focus on measurement and impacts, have contributed to the
escalating ambitions of the field.
A. Mixed Causalities Between Law and Economic Growth
There has been much scholarly interest in broadly establishing
correlation or even causality between law and economic development.
Evaluating this causal linkage produces mixed results but also
fundamentally challenges scholars to find evidence for such causality.
Generally this literature can be divided into optimists who argue that law
stimulates economic growth and skeptics who do not find such a

121. See, e.g., Elin Cohen et al., Truth and Consequences in Rule of Law: Inferences, Attribution
and Evaluation, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1 (2011); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Prepare Your Indicators:
Economics Imperialism on the Shores of Law and Development, 7 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 401 (2011);
Veronica Taylor, The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transition
Economies, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 83;
Stephanie E. Trapnell, Actionable Governance Indicators: Turning Measurement into Reform, 3 HAGUE
J. ON RULE L. 317 (2011).
122. Cohen et al., supra note 121, at 107.
123. Hammergren, supra note 17, at 305.
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relationship.124
Optimists argue that “[t]here is substantial evidence that some major
legal rules and institutions (such as democracy, property rights, and certain
government regulations) have a distinctly positive effect on growth”125 or
that there is indication of a “strong correlation between the ‘rule of law’
and economic growth”126 (although correlation is not causation). Indeed,
scholars who have examined the role of law and legal institutions in Asian
economic development between 1960 and 1995 have found evidence to
suggest that law did affect economic development, depending on how
countries approached the role of markets in the economy, but they admit
that establishing exact linkages between law and economic growth is not
easy, as there is a complex interplay of a multitude of factors.127 This
relationship has also been positively reported in the legal origins and “Law
and Finance” scholarship. An influential paper that launched the latter
field argues that countries with a legal system rooted in the common law
fare better in financial development than those with continental legal
systems.128
Skeptics have been more doubtful about the causal link between legal
institutions and economic growth.129 For example, Kenneth Dam’s work
on the “law-growth nexus” questions the core thesis of law and finance that
the origins of a legal system determine financial performance and disputes
the idea that legal origins theory holds value for understanding broader
economic performance.130 He argues that these fields of study fail to
produce results that developing countries can use and that they
oversimplify and ignore details that are vital to understanding how legal
124. For an overview of this literature, see generally Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 15.
125. Cross, supra note 8, at 1738–39.
126. Katharina Pistor, There Is No Single Field of Law and Development, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 168, 168 (2009).
127. KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN
ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960–1995, at 4–7 (1999).
128. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
129. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22
THIRD WORLD Q. 21, 21 (2001) (“There is surprisingly little conclusive evidence that reforms in
particular areas of law such as property law, contract law and human rights law have been effective in
furthering development, however conceived.”); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic
Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 132 (1999) (finding that
little is known of the actual effects of judicial reform on economic performance and counseling that “in
the absence of a better theoretical understanding of the impact of judicial reform, care is required in
designing and implementing projects”); Pistor, supra note 126, at 169–70 (“[W]e lack a sound
theoretical basis for explaining why the correlation between legal development and economic growth
holds across some countries, but breaks down in others. . . . [W]e continue to know very little about the
political economy of legal reforms and their distributional effects.”).
130. DAM, supra note 15, at 5.
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institutions actually influence economic activity, contending that other
factors, including microeconomic policy initiatives, impact legal
reforms.131 Some skeptics have suggested that a country’s receptivity to a
transplanted law is more determinative of the prospects of the transplant
than whether the country has a civil or common law legal system.132
In the debate about law and economic growth, skeptics present East
Asia as an important test case. Neo-institutional and legal origin studies
have difficulty explaining the extraordinary economic performance of
countries such as China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Some scholars
debate whether China demonstrates that economic growth requires clear
property rights or enforceable contracts,133 whether it is an example of a
country that has been able to do well economically even without formal,
legally protected property rights,134 or indeed whether Asian “success”
stories such as China demonstrate the importance of informal, reputationbased institutions when state-provided rules “are unavailable or
unenforced.”135
Within the law and development literature of the last decade, there has
been far less systematic study of the connection between law and the more
broadly conceived approaches to development focusing on the individual
and the poor that have become more influential. One such study examined
the link between law and six theoretical perspectives on development but
found no clear evidence of law’s positive influence on development,
however conceptualized.136
A large-brush approach is necessary to analyze the impact of law and
certain kinds of legal arrangements on economic growth, but such an
approach is problematic. Not only does it remain methodologically
difficult to neatly filter the impact of law on economic growth from that of
other contributory factors (whether natural, political, historical, or cultural),
but the level of abstraction necessary to make general statements about the
relationship between law and economic growth obscures vital details about
particular kinds of legal arrangements. Attempts at understanding such
131. Id. at 207.
132. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47
EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003).
133. See Clarke, supra note 15, at 66.
134. See Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese
Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551, 554–55 (2008) (arguing
that such rights may not be a necessary condition for economic growth but are vital for dealing with
distributional issues once growth develops).
135. See Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia,
34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829, 834 (2000).
136. See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 129.
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details produce findings not easily generalized. In sum, disentangling the
relationship between law and economic growth requires a level of detail
combined with a level of cross-border historical data that is impossible to
gather, analyze, and generalize. The inherent inconclusiveness of this body
of work raises a number of questions. Can developing countries follow
legal models of other more developed countries and hope, based on
optimistic studies, that development will follow? Should legal work be
abandoned because of the lack of categorical proof of any economic
benefit? Is law only important for economic development?
These questions raise concerns over the effect that the increasing
emphasis on impact (especially quantitatively measured impact in terms of
economic growth) will have on the understanding and improvement of the
complex functioning of law and legal reform within a broader notion of
development. The studies discussed here simplify and obscure rather than
explain. It is too easy to blame solely the normative, mathematical, and
quantitative approaches and methodologies used in the broader
evaluations.137 It is more logical to look to the original ambitious goals that
the field has adopted. By contending that law can create economic growth,
the field has opened itself to the economists and mathematicians whose
simplified indicators and contrasting findings may undermine the field’s
well-intended quest to improve the functioning of law in development.
B. Criticism of Rule of Law Interventions
Of all the law and development ambitions discussed here, the impact
of the projects and programs seeking to advance the Rule of Law paradigm
have received the strongest criticism. In the first decade of the twenty-first
century, the field of law and development at times resembled the American
Law and Development Movement of the 1970s, with scholars and
practitioners alike arguing that the Rule of Law paradigm, or Rule of Law
Orthodoxy as it became known,138 had failed and should be replaced.139
The discrepancy between the field’s highly raised expectations and its
disappointing results was ultimately blamed in part on its original
ambitions.
Criticism centered chiefly on the wide range of activities that were
undertaken to strengthen and build the rule of law in other countries. Three
levels of reform can be distinguished: namely substantive legislative
137. See Perry-Kessaris, supra note 121, at 417 (arguing that the development of indicators to
measure law and development has been a form of economic imperialism that uses a simplistic
normative, mathametical, and quantifying approach).
138. Upham, supra note 42, at 75.
139. Golub, supra note 12, at 161.
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reform, institutional strengthening through training and financial support,
and deeper institutional reform, such as the establishment of an
independent judiciary, that relies “less on technical or institutional
measures than on enlightened leadership and sweeping changes in the
values and attitudes of those in power.”140 A general criticism of rule of
law-oriented legal reform is that, despite these activities, it has been
ineffective in bringing about development, especially with respect to the
poor and the disadvantaged.141 Scholars have also emphasized that rule of
law practice suffers from a lack of knowledge142 and particularly a lack of
recognition of the plurality of law, a concept which must be integrated into
legal development.143
Several studies question the existence of proof that law can aid
development,144 recalling the ambiguity of the findings about the causality
of law and development discussed above.145 Others, still believing in the
law’s capacity to contribute to development, argue that more data is needed
to determine the kind of legal reform that leads to development146 and that
successful legislative reforms should be based on thorough social scientific
research about the norms and contexts of the target of the reform.147 In
140. Carothers, supra note 30, at 8.
141. See, e.g., id. at 15 (summarizing the lack of knowledge that rule of law practitioners have and
the obstacles to knowledge and learning that exist); Golub, supra note 42, at 131 (discussing the lack of
applied research as a foundation for rule of law reforms).
142. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note, at 11; Golub, supra note 42, at 131.
143. See, e.g., H. Patrick Glenn, Sustainable Diversity in Law, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 39, 56
(2011) (suggesting that “rule of laws” might form a better conceptual bedrock for activity in this area);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1,
13–16 (2011) (suggesting that legal pluralism both challenges and may offer potential support for rule
of law activity).
144. See e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 109–10; Upham, supra note 42, at 80–82 (questioning
whether economic growth always needs formal institutions and whether it cannot also flourish in an
informal economic and legal setting).
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 142, at 25–27; Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About
Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11,
at 137; Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Processes and Criteria for Success, in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL
AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 11, 12 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2001).
147. See, e.g., PIP NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS: THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALIST
VIETNAM 231–40 (2007); ANN SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL
CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (2001); John Gillespie, Developing a Decentred Analysis of Legal
Transfers, in EXAMINING PRACTICE, INTERROGATING THEORY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES IN ASIA
25, 40–41 (Penelope (Pip) Nicholson & Sarah Biddulph eds., 2008) (arguing for the need to adopt a
non-state centric focus when analyzing legal transfers and to use discourse analysis in such a study);
Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Using Reason and Experience to Draft Country-Specific Laws, in
MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND

VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

324

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

6/30/2014 3:27 PM

[Vol 24:297

many developmental contexts, however, such research capacity may be
limited, and getting policymakers and lawmakers to sufficiently research
the contexts of reform initiatives is unlikely.148
Criticism also suggests that the top-down character of rule of law
reform projects does not sufficiently consider or incorporate local
contexts.149 This allegedly arises because Western experts tend to take the
context of their own jurisdiction for granted150 or because foreign experts,
“[b]eing confident of their expertise and good intentions . . . are under no
pressure to interrogate their own political and legal culture or to investigate
in any depth that of the host country.”151 A combination of lack of
knowledge and top-down policy and implementation may lead to
unforeseen results152 that may even sometimes conflict with the original
aims of reform and cause a deterioration of the local situation.153 In
international legal development projects, which are the subject matter of
most scholarly studies, such top-down operational methods further run the
risk of ethnocentricity.154
Legal scholars have also criticized rule of law reform as too statecentered and overly focused on courts and the processes of lawmaking
because it predominantly examines the aid or reform of state institutions.155
Some scholars maintain that, as a result, the reforms will not reach the
GOOD GOVERNANCE 249 (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1999).
148. NICHOLSON, supra note 147, at 237 (noting that academic sources about local legal systems
often exist but are frequently not consulted); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative
Theory for Developing Countries, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 147, at 145, 148, 150 (arguing
that severe resource and time constraints preclude decent research).
149. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 4–5
(2002); Julio Faundez, Legal Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries: Making Haste Slowly,
in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND
EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 146, at 369, 378; Golub, supra note 42, at 121
(criticizing rule of law reformers for not paying sufficient attention to how local obstacles, including
corruption and local politics, undermine reform efforts).
150. Golub, supra note 42, at 127.
151. Howard Dick, Why Law Reform Fails: Indonesia’s Anti-corruption Efforts, in LAW REFORM
IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 42, 60.
152. Garth, supra note 146, at 23–24.
153. Faundez, supra note 149, at 380–81.
154. See Garth, supra note 146, at 23–24 (“The problem is the same one that comes from thinking
that what is widely accepted in the United States is universally valid.”); Tim Lindsey, Preface, in LAW
REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at xix, xix–xx (emphasizing “the
dangers that lie in an approach that ‘orientalises’ Asian societies”).
155. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 142, at 21; Golub, supra note 42, at 105–06; Nader, supra
note 74, at 92, 107; Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Legal Pluralism and Social Justice in Economic and
Political Development, IDS BULL., Jan. 2001, at 46, 46; Woodman, supra note 69, at 28.
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poor, thus doing little to enhance their lives, and may even strengthen the
position of existing elites.156 Skeptics further suggest that the state may not
be well-positioned to help the poor and that more attention should be paid
to civil society.157
Furthermore, state-centered approaches lack effectiveness in contexts
in which non-state normative systems are important and in which legal
reform should address issues of legal pluralism.158 Some suggest that the
adoption of a regulatory approach to law and development might enable a
better understanding of the role of regulation in particular contexts and that
this granular, decentered analysis of law will illuminate how best to
develop it.159 The regulatory theorists caution that there is high risk in
dichotomizing state and non-state actors and that there is a real need to
recognize institutional hybrids of state and non-state actors and to explore
“their broader relationship to the fragmented and multiple legal order.”160
The top-down character of rule of law reform programs can be
attributed in part to some donors, such as the World Bank and the U.S.
Agency for International Development, necessarily cooperating
predominantly with national governments in targeted countries.161 As the
legal systems in many developing states interact in complex ways with
local, non-state justice systems as well, legal reform also requires
engagement with those systems.162 Such activity, however, requires
international development agencies to acquire “a considerable amount of
knowledge of the complex political arrangements underlying [non-state
justice systems] and adjunct structures.”163
156. See, e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 109–10; Vivek Maru, Access to Justice and Legal
Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 259, 262–64 (2010); Taylor,
supra note 121, at 98.
157. See, e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 110.
158. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, The Multiple Edges of Law: Dealing with Legal Pluralism in
Development Practice, in 2 WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 69, at 63 (arguing that the existence of legal pluralism can also constrain “interventionist
objectives and practices”).
159. See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Institutional Hybrids and the Rule of Law as a Regulatory
Project, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 145,
158 (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that regulatory approaches might enable reformers
to better understand regulatory dynamics and how to improve them in diverse locations).
160. Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 157.
161. Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Toward an
Agenda for Reforming the Reformers, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 16, at 290–91.
162. See von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 158, at 63–64 (“If local people keep their local law,
exercise their own land rights, and go to traditional authorities for dispute management, it may have . . .
to do with their reaction against state law and the social practices associated with it . . . .”).
163. Julio Faundez, Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State Building or
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Scholars further warn that rule of law practice is insufficiently aware
of or naïve about its inherently political nature.164 Part of this criticism
concerns the assumption that legal reform is mere “technical assistance,”165
rendering reform efforts insufficiently attuned to underlying power
structures and interests and inherently political questions and
transformations.166 Vested interests, lack of political will, widespread
corruption, and lack of demand among elites can render reform efforts
directed at state institutions fruitless.167 General disinterest or resistance of
the general public may be an even more formidable obstacle to successful
legal reform.168 These facts are not always recognized in rule of law
reform practice.169 As reforming law, even in a strictly technical sense, is

Legal Reform?, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 18, 37 (2011).
164. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense,
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 95.
165. See, e.g., S. Newton, Law and Development, Law and Economics and the Fate of Legal
Technical Assistance, in LAWMAKING FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORATIONS INTO THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROJECTS 23, 23 (J. Arnscheidt et al. eds., 2008).
166. See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 149, at 5 (noting that law is at the core of power
and that this centrality is crucial to analyses of the function of law in society); Dick, supra note 151, at
53 (“The fundamental issue in reform is not the consistency of law but how the state, with all its
ramifications, exercises its immense powers and in whose interests.”); Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in
Developing Countries, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at
107 (claiming that reforms are not sufficiently attuned to issues of power and politics).
167. See Carothers, supra note 142, at 22 (noting that there has been little attempt to understand
the “will” to reform, although it was identified some time ago); Golub, supra note 42, at 113, 116
(arguing that legal reform projects fail when there is no support from local institutions and that energy
spent on court reform, instead of on local “rules of the game” that affect the poor, are worthless);
Goodpaster, supra note 166, at 130–31 (arguing that donor efforts to create political will where it is
lacking are likely ineffective and should instead be directed at changing and neutralizing incentive
structures and creating demand for law); see also Goodpaster, supra note 166, at 107 (arguing that the
success of reform depends on taking into account existing social, economic, and cultural incentive
systems and adapting reform-generated incentives accordingly). For examples of failed legal reform
due to elite intransigence, see LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 270–71, 278 (1998) (arguing
that the largely failed Peruvian legal reforms attracted interest only from a small group of lawyers and
noting that elite disinterest in reforms is as problematic as elite opposition to them); Daniel Adler &
Sokbunthoeun So, Toward Equity in Development When the Law Is Not the Law: Reflections on Legal
Pluralism in Practice, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN
DIALOGUE, supra note 159, at 83, 90 (arguing that the Cambodian land law reform experience, which
tried to alter entrenched elite practices, was largely unsuccessful); Jeffrey A. Clark et al., The Collapse
of the World Bank’s Judicial Reform Project in Peru, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 159, 172–73 (attributing the collapse of a large World Bank
justice reform project in Peru to an indisputably clear case of executive disdain); Pip Nicholson & Sally
Low, Local Accounts of Rule of Law Aid: Implications for Donors, 5 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 36, 41–42
(2013) (noting that the Vietnamese legal reform agenda is managed not by donors but by the Party-State
and that many reforms bolster entrenched elites).
168. HAMMERGREN, supra note 167, at 302.
169. Id. at 270 (noting that reformers fail to appreciate that laws will not be implemented without
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reforming power, reform efforts should adopt reforms that are favored by
the local population.
Further, there is a base question of whether foreign (usually Western)
powers and their donor agencies have the moral authority to impose
idealized notions of the rule of law in those states in which law is
differently conceived and valued.170 Even if moral authority can be
rationalized, where recipient country leadership is opposed to the
ideological bases upon which rule of law projects are founded, prospects
for the adoption of particular reforms are limited.171 As noted in the
discussion of the transplant effect above, unsupported rule of law reforms
will founder.172
While all of these criticisms are more or less accurate, a final point of
criticism is crucial: rule of law reform has made great promises it cannot
fulfill. Given the immense complexities that social engineering through
law entails173 and its inherent resource, knowledge, and support limitations,
expectations about the potential achievements of legal reform should be
tempered.
Further, the speed at which change is expected to occur is frequently
unrealistic.174 Legal reform can only be successful if given sufficient time;
haste and impatience are counterproductive. Most law and development
projects, however, run on short project cycles.175 Accordingly, law and
local will and support); NICHOLSON, supra note 147, at 237 (arguing that Soviet legal aid to Vietnam
also largely ignored local conditions); Newton, supra note 165, at 46 (advocating for research on costs,
incentives, institutions, and impacts in order to determine how legal technical assistance might be
relevant to a locality); Upham, supra note 42, at 76 (“Law . . . is seen as technology when it should be
seen as sociology or politics.”).
170. See Pip Nicholson with Simon Pitt, Official Discourses and Court-Oriented Legal Reform in
Vietnam, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF LEGAL TRANSFERS 202, 204
(John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson eds., 2012) (observing that viewing legal reform as mere technical
assistance obscures the moral dimension of the reform).
171. For example, in Vietnam, donor-funded, court-oriented legal reform that is ideologically
motivated has poor prospects of success where it challenges the Vietnamese leadership’s ideology. See
Nicholson with Pitt, supra note 170, at 235–36 (describing the Vietnamese government’s control of
reform); see also Rolf Knieper, Pulls and Pushes of Legal Reform in Post-Communist States, 2 HAGUE
J. ON RULE L. 111, 125–26 (2010) (arguing that the export of the common law is doomed if it has
neither roots nor local support and rejecting the legal origins thesis).
172. See supra note 132.
173. Peter P. Houtzager, “We Make the Law and the Law Makes Us”: Some Ideas on a Law in
Development Research Agenda, 32 IDS BULL. 8, 14–15 (2001) (questioning how much law actually
matters in the complexities of larger social outcomes and individual decision-making).
174. In Cambodia and Vietnam, for instance, local stakeholders involved in court-oriented legal
reform declared that timelines imposed by donor agencies are unrealistic and too often damaging.
Nicholson & Low, supra note 167, at 5.
175. Channell, supra note 146, at 141–42; see also ANTONY ALLOTT, THE LIMITS OF LAW 175
(1980) (complaining about impatient policymakers in developing countries who seek to create large
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development also suffers from internal problems related to donor
bureaucracy.176 Pressure to spend money, the ongoing use of best practice
models, demands for accountability, and the inherent complexity of legal
reform in different settings have led to weak project preparation and the
limited usage of existing knowledge and research.177 All of this is
exacerbated by weak evaluations of (and thus weak information about) the
reforms that work and that do not and by the inability to translate lessons
from failure into improvement for the future.178
High ambitions have set Rule of Law projects up for failure, as they
are not matched to available means and to practical, political, and temporal
constraints. It appears logical, given the increasing attention on impact,
that the field move toward more realistic goals that can be defended,
achieved, and evaluated. But this has not happened. On the contrary, the
field has added further layers of ambition through the Bottom-Up Justice,
Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional Justice paradigms.
C. Evaluating Bottom-Up and Customary Justice
The impact of Bottom-Up and Customary Justice projects has not
escaped scrutiny either. Compared to all other paradigms discussed,
however, such attention has been mostly in the form of internal evaluation
rather than scholarly analysis.179
Evaluative studies have identified a number of positive impacts of
Bottom-Up projects.180 Several studies have found that interventions under

social changes through programmatic usage of law).
176. See Carothers, supra note 142, at 25–27 (noting that rule of law aid, despite existing for more
than 30 years, still suffers from an acute lack of insight that has been perpetuated by aid organizations);
Golub, supra note 42, at 128–31 (noting that “bureaucratic inertia” produces a lack of imagination and
responsiveness to local needs and that donor structures produce biases, inflexible budgetary processes,
lack of informed decision-making, and sectoral compartmentalization); Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law
and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers’
Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra
note 16, at 336, 350 (noting that lender incentives to loan as much money as possible leads them to lend
to incompetent or corrupt countries where the aid is used less effectively).
177. Channell, supra note 146, at 150–57.
178. See id. at 154–56 (detailing the disincentives for carrying out thorough evaluations and
learning from them).
179. But see, e.g., Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 157–58; Doug J. Porter, Some Implications of the
Application of Legal Pluralism to Development Practice, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT:
SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE, supra note 159, at 162, 172 (both arguing that the
dynamic of customary justice projects might be analyzed through a regulatory lens).
180. A collection of studies organized by the International Institute for Environment and
Development and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found positive results in
typical bottom-up interventions involving paralegals, legal literacy, public interest litigation, legal
clinics, and rights information centers. Rita H. Aciro-Lakor, Land Rights Information Centres in
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these paradigms have improved legal knowledge, economic well-being,
gender equality, land tenure security, and participation.181 A study of a
USAID-sponsored community court program in Bolivia by a former
USAID executive noticed greater legal awareness and success in
“addressing the legal needs of marginalized populations.”182 A study of
three projects funded by the World Bank Justice for the Poor program
found that the development of “peace communities” in northern Kenya has
become a popular and successful way to “define ground rules between
different local [justice] systems.”183 It also found that labor arbitration
courts have steadily increased their case loads and have managed “to find
for the most part, workable resolutions minimally acceptable to all parties”
(especially impressive given the difficult local political context).184 A
UNDP-commissioned assessment of a project on legal empowerment
Uganda, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN
AFRICA, supra note 46, at 71, 72; Boubacar Ba, Paralegals as Agents of Legal Empowerment in the
Bankass Area of Mali, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND
RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 45, 46; Lilian Laurin Barros, Legal Clinics and Participatory LawMaking for Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Congo, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE:
USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 119, 120–21; Yahya Kane,
Legal Literacy Training in the Thiès Region of Senegal, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING
LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 83, 84; Simeon Koroma,
Paralegals and Community Oversight Boards in Sierra Leone, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE:
USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 77, 78–79; Ednah
Mndeme, Awareness-Raising and Public Interest Litigation for Mining Communities in Tanzania, in
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra
note 46, at 93, 95–96. They conclude that these interventions have improved land tenure security in
certain customary law settings. Aciro-Lakor, supra, at 74; Ba, supra, at 56–58; Barros, supra, at 122;
Kane, supra, at 88; Koroma, supra, at 77; Mndeme, supra, at 96.
181. See Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 74; Ba, supra note 180, at 58; Barros, supra note 180, at
122; Koroma, supra note 180, at 82.
182. Tiernan Mennen, The Mystery of Legal Empowerment: Livelihoods and Community Justice in
Bolivia, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: PRACTITIONERS’ PERSPECTIVES 63, 70, 73 (Int’l Dev. Law Org.,
Legal and Governance Reform: Lessons Learned No. 2, Stephen Golub ed., 2010), available at
http://www.idlo.org/Documents/Legal_Empowerment_Practitioners_Perspectives_Book.pdf.
183. Caroline Sage et al., Taking the Rules of the Game Seriously: Mainstreaming Justice in
Development: The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor Program 8 (World Bank Justice Reform Practice
Grp., Justice & Development Working Paper No. 51845, 2009), available at http://a4id.org/sites/
default/files/Taking%20the%20Rules%20of%20the%20Game%20Seriously%20-%20Mainstreaming
%20Justice%20in%20Development.pdf.
184. Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The co-founder and co-director of a World
Bank-funded paralegal program in Sierra Leone declared that the Bank’s Justice for the Poor programs
in Ecuador and Sierra Leone, and specifically the legal aid and paralegal projects, had a positive impact.
Maru, supra note 156, at 265–67 (describing the “impressive rates of case resolution” in Ecuador as “a
startling success,” claiming that the “respondents [in Sierra Leone] were overwhelmingly positive
[about their experiences with the paralegals],” and praising the “effectiveness [of the paralegals] in
resolving difficult disputes” and the “strong evidence that [the paralegal organization was] indeed
empowering [its] clients, the paralegals themselves, and the community as a whole to claim their rights
and pursue cases that had previously stagnated”).
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through community radio noted that “[t]he project heightened awareness of
rights and helped reduce tolerance of injustice” and concluded that “this
experimental project has been a success worthy of replication and,
importantly, of continuing support, with a possible view to incorporation
into the UNDP agenda.”185
Customary Justice initiatives appear to have had positive impacts as
well. A UNDP-commissioned study about worldwide Customary Justice
interventions, such as legal awareness training through literacy courses,
information groups, education campaigns, the publication of guidebooks on
state and non-state laws, and traveling street theatre found that these have
helped improve the position of vulnerable groups and have provided entry
points for human rights in Bangladesh, Malawi, Timor-Leste, Indonesia,
and Cambodia.186 It further concluded that paralegals, lawyers’ networks,
dispute clearinghouses and resolution panels, and ADR training have all
improved legal aid in Sierra Leone, Thailand, East Timor, Puerto Rico, and
Cambodia.187 It noted finally that capacity development for informal
justice actors in the areas of mediation and citizens’ rights works
reasonably well in Burundi, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda, and
Bangladesh.188
Customary Justice interventions face limits and challenges, however.
Interventions are constrained by a number of factors, including a lack of
paralegal capacity,189 resistant local elites who fear a subversion of their
power base,190 donor dependency and a lack of sustainability,191 a lack of
confidence and trust in the community,192 and “cut-throat antagonism”
between weak and poor communities and powerful outside investors.193
Additionally, limited numbers of representatives in newly established local
organizations restrict the potential impact of such organizations.194
Interventions also face difficulty training lay persons as paralegals, a

185. USHA RAMANATHAN, THE ASIA-PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: INDIA COUNTRY
ASSESSMENT 7–8 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/
publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dgttf-/india-country-assessment-the-asia-pacificrights-and-justice-initiative/IndiaA2JCountryAssessment.pdf.
186. WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 33–34.
187. Id. at 35–36.
188. Id. at 38–39.
189. Ba, supra note 180, at 50–58.
190. Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 75; Ba, supra note 180, at 58–59.
191. Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 71–77; Kane, supra note 180, at 90; Mndeme, supra note
180, at 97.
192. Barros, supra note 180, at 122; Mndeme, supra note 180, at 97.
193. Mndeme, supra note 180, at 97.
194. Sage et al., supra note 183, at 14.
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prevalence of ceremony over capacity, gender quotas for adjudicators that
undermine community cohesion, dissatisfaction among disputing parties
over emphases on reconciliation, the perpetuation of the absence of formal
institutions as informal dispute mechanisms are strengthened, and a lack of
sustainability and local legitimacy.195 Overall community progress has
hinged much more on local sociopolitical factors, including the perceived
external threat to local tenure security, leader capacities, group cohesion,
and ongoing land conflicts.196
Challenges of scale exist also, as projects have hardly ever moved
beyond small pilots. Scaling projects up to cover whole regions, especially
when trying to do so sustainably and while maintaining independence from
the government, is fraught with issues.197 The UNDP’s Access to Justice
program in Cambodia only accomplished half of its goals—and even those
took longer than expected—leaving its sustainability uncertain.198 The
program’s positive impact “remains limited as the communes/districts
covered by the project are few in relation to the national territory.”199 The
concept of legal empowerment as operationalized by the now-defunct
Commission for Legal Empowerment for the Poor (CLEP) has been
strongly criticized for overambition, inconsistencies in its conceptual
framework of legal empowerment, an excessive focus on theories of legal
exclusion, a failure to incorporate other factors responsible for injustice and
poverty, inadequate attention to gender issues, applying a top-down
approach even while advocating a bottom-up approach, and insufficient
attention to the inherent political and power issues at play.200

195. WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 35, 38–39.
196. Rachael Knight, The Community Land Titling Initiative: An Investigation into Best Practices
for the Protection of Customary Land Claims, in WORKING WITH CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
POST-CONFLICT AND FRAGILE STATES 145, 162 (Erica Harper ed., 2011).
197. Maru, supra note 156, at 269–70.
198. VELIBOR POPOVIĆ, THE ASIA-PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: CAMBODIA
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT 7 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009).
199. Id. at 13.
200. Dan Banik, Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty
Eradication, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 117, 121–26 (2009) (criticizing the claimed linkages between the
legal empowerment approach and both democracy and human rights for being not sufficiently validated
and for weakening the conceptual underpinnings of the legal empowerment approach and faulting
CLEP for failing to address a variety of legal issues that are important to poverty reduction, including
education, violence against women, inequality, and social exclusion); Julio Faundez, Empowering
Workers in the Informal Economy, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 156, 171–72 (2009) (arguing that a Peruvian
case study reveals that legally empowering those in the informal economy requires ecomomic, social
and political strategies as well as legal reform); Matthew Stephens, The Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor: A Opportunity Missed, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 132, 134 (2009) (noting that
one of the fundamental gaps in CLEP’s work is its failure to address the challenges of policy and
institutional change required to empower the poor despite its unique position).
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There are several issues that require clarification before the legal
community concludes that these projects have the impact sought and that
they succeed where Rule of Law has failed. First is the definition of
impact. Most of the studies discussed here have looked at the immediate
impact of particular problems found in the local communities where a
project was implemented. Scholars should instead ask whether individual
impacts cumulatively result in a broader impact on empowerment, access to
justice, minority rights protection, and capital integration. Impact can be
understood in terms of its achievements or in the manner in which they
were obtained. While the Bottom-up and Customary Justice paradigms
stress a bottom-up approach based on local knowledge, the similarities in
the approaches that have been tried across the world in different programs
with diverse donors demonstrate that a top-down approach remains
influential.
Second is the scale and sustainability of these programs. Most
projects studied are relatively small-scale and pilot-like, and yet it is often
assumed that their positive impacts can be a basis for broader interventions
that cover larger areas for longer periods of time. Additionally, it is not
clear whether the projects would have succeeded without significant donor
support and a narrow geographical focus, that the success can be sustained
without the donor, or that the project can be transplanted through a best
practice-type approach.
Thirdly, there is a risk of concluding that projects achieved positive
outcomes on the basis of the impacts of those projects. Measuring the
impacts of Bottom-Up and Customary Justice interventions is highly
challenging, as it requires establishing causality between a multitude of
interventions and a variety of complex outcomes (empowerment,
awareness, access to capital, etc.).201 Few of the studies detail their
research methods,202 and even they merely state that surveys were used or
provide no details on what type of data on outputs and impact was gathered

201. See Sumaiya Khair, Evaluating Legal Empowerment: Problems of Analysis and
Measurement, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 33, 36 (2009) (“It is indeed difficult to establish a causal link
between specific legal actions and the resultant legal actions and the resultant development. One of the
fundamental problems in assessing legal empowerment is that the characteristics and conduct that typify
empowerment in one context may well have different implications in another.”); see also ADAM L.
MASSER, MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR (United Nations
Dev. Programme, Discussion Paper No. 6, 2009), available at http://gaportal.org/sites/default/files/
Measurement-Methodologies-for-Legal-Empowerement-of-the-Poor.pdf (addressing issues surrounding
the methodology of measuring legal empowerment).
202. But see Knight, supra note 196, at 157–58 (providing a clear methodology and comparison of
groups at different levels of the intervention).
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or the methods used to gather it.203 Most studies merely describe the
context and aims of a project and then discuss its results and challenges,
only occasionally mentioning its failures.204
This framing almost
automatically leads to a positive portrayal of the intervention as the best
way to solve a particular problem.205 Some studies risk portraying
initiatives as successes simply by describing their achieved outputs206 or
even worse by simply restating the aims that they sought to address.207
Few studies systematically analyze in detail which conditions explain their
positive or negative outcomes. Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, most
impact studies discussed here were carried out by the people directly
responsible for the conceptualization, funding, or execution of the project.
While these studies were of course done in as objective of a manner as
possible, a positive bias may nonetheless have arisen.208 To fully ascertain
the data presented, more study by independent scholars is necessary.
Some of the studies propose remedies to deal with the projects’
limitations. Several are reiterations of the original bottom-up paradigm.209
Some call for more research, a deeper empirical understanding of both

203. See e.g., ERICA HARPER, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: FROM PROGRAM DESIGN TO IMPACT
EVALUATION
(2011),
available
at
http://www.idlo.org/Publications/CustomaryJustice1.pdf;
WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67.
204. See e.g., Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 74–75; Ba, supra note 180, at 59–60; Kane, supra
note 180, at 88–91; Mndeme, supra note 180, at 96–97.
205. See, e.g., HARPER, supra note 203 (providing one of the broadest overviews of how to
improve customary justice systems and summarizing what should be done under certain circumstances).
While this study does list the challenges of the possible interventions, it ends each section only with an
overview of “entry points” and “good practices,” without a clear summary of what should or should not
be done under particular conditions. See id. at 52–55, 75–80, 90–95.
206. See, e.g., Mennen, supra note 182, at 9–13 (compiling plenty of data about activities and
issues but leaving implicit the nexus between the program and the goal of enhancing access to justice
for the poor). See Cohen et al., supra note 121, at 108 for further discussion of this problem.
207. See, e.g., ANA PATRICIA GRAÇA, THE ASIA PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE:
REGIONAL ASSESSMENT 24 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/
aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dgttf-/regional-assessment-the-asia-pacificrights-and-justice-initiative/UNDPRegionalBookfinal.pdf; Sage et al., supra note 183, at 15 (reiterating
principles and lessons rather than evaluating what works and what does not based on existing data).
208. See Channell, supra note 146, at 154 (“Reports are written primarily by people who are paid
by those who receive the reports. The writer’s job is to provide information in such a way as to meet
the client’s expectations. One of those expectations is implementation success that will justify ongoing
or new funding. . . . Thus, there are few reports detailing mistakes or failures. Where they exist,
implementers know how to describe them as successes.”).
209. See, e.g., GRAÇA, supra note 207, at 41, 48 (maintaining that “ownership is necessary” and
that reformers should “forge closer links between traditional and formal justice”); Maru, supra note
156, at 280 (suggesting that reformers “be attentive to particularities of sociolegal context” and that
“reforms have a greater chance of success when they grow out of local initiative”); Sage et al., supra
note 183, at 16–17 (discussing “institutional reform as an ‘interim process’” and advocating “deep
engagement with local contexts”).
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interventions and their contexts,210 and better and more independent
evaluations.211 Some studies concurrently advocate a combined bottom-up
and broader state-centered strategy under the Rule of Law paradigm,
stating that the two cannot be unlinked.212
When these recommendations are read together with the challenges
listed in the Bottom-Up and Customary Justice literature, the ambition of
these paradigms in practice is evident. How can Bottom-Up and
Customary Justice paradigms operate together with the Rule of Law
paradigm in a bottom-up manner? Furthermore, how can it be alleged that
there will be broader impacts beyond pilot projects, with more resources
invested in research and evaluation? And finally, how does any of this
overcome structural resistance from local power asymmetries and lack of
local support and capacity?
D. Questions About Post-Conflict State-Building
Rule of law promotion in the context of post-conflict state-building
has elicited many critical questions.213 Many of the problems mentioned in
the literature on justice programs in the context of state-building resemble
issues discussed by rule of law critics more generally. First is a lack of
local knowledge and a mismatch between program goals and local
conditions.214 The lack of local knowledge in these types of foreign210. See, e.g., ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 24 (noting the shortage of rigorous evaluation
and research that can inform legal empowerment strategies and activities and of related efforts in such
fields as governance and rule of law); id. at 124 (stressing the need to work with local experts to
identify legal empowerment issues and constraints in a given country or working context); Maru, supra
note 156, at 278-279 (reviewing calls by different experts in the field for more in-depth and
sophisticated research); Sage et al., supra note 183, at 17–18 (arguing that governance and justice work
should rely less on “tool kits” and “best practices” and more on local research capacity and highlighting
the importance of deep engagement with local context to avoid the “common risk of importing
assumptions about what should be, or jumping to an idealized end product”).
211. See, e.g., GRAÇA, supra note 207, at 47.
212. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ACCELERATING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: A UNDP RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE 1 (2010), available at http://www.unrol.
org/files/RoL-A2J%20GP%20Annual%20Report%202010%20DGG%20BDP.pdf (integrating rule of
law building with access to justice).
213. See, e.g., Bruce Baker & Eric Scheye, Access to Justice in a Post-conflict State: DonorSupported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 171, 177
(2009) (“However assessed, it is clear that a state-centric justice system will take more than a
generation to establish and even then will, most likely, be unsustainable. There is also little likelihood
that the state system will provide much safety and justice to most southern Sudanese of the current
generation.”).
214. See, e.g., Bâli, supra note 94, at 445 (stating that the American-backed rule of law projects
“have relied on best practices compilations and a hodge-podge of local customs and traditions . . . .
Patched together from a number of other contexts, but fundamentally informed by a conception of
political and legal institutions appropriate for a Western-style liberal democracy, these projects have

VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

6/30/2014 3:27 PM

335

dominated justice projects in post-conflict situations is similar to (but more
extreme than) that in average law and development projects carried out in
more stable contexts. The post-conflict context draws a particular type of
foreign expert, who, because of the lower pay, higher risk, and shorter
contracts, is more junior and has only a small amount of narrow work
experience but who must face an often complex local situation, having very
limited local knowledge and insufficient time to gain any, and operating in
relative social seclusion.215
Second, echoing the Rule of Law critics, post-conflict justice sector
reforms are too focused on building state institutions and pay insufficient
attention to whether these are accessible and meet societal needs and to
existing alternative non-state systems.216
Citizens in post-conflict
situations may deeply distrust police institutions and have trouble accessing
newly constructed state courts (because of distance, cost, and
unfamiliarity).217 Consequently most citizens do not go to the police or
state courts and resort to local, non-state forms of police and dispute
management.218 Thus, citizens do not necessarily need state-delivered
justice; they might prefer improved local systems to expensive and
inaccessible state systems.219
There are, however, also problems that are particular to the
challenging conditions of post-conflict countries. First is a lack of basic
security, which is a vital precondition for the functioning of justice
institutions.220 When public insecurity is pervasive, it is very difficult to
develop respect for the law, let alone a law that has only recently been
established by a foreign occupying power seen as responsible for the
insecurity.221 Additionally, especially in countries that have experienced
long-term conflict and that have a fragile state government, there is very
little capacity to staff the newly established justice institutions.222 Apart
little lasting impact or success in the local contexts in which they have operated.”).
215. Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L.
361, 364–65, 373–76, 383–84, 386 (2008).
216. See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 171 (questioning assumptions about the need
and acceptability of post-conflict rebuilding of the justice sector).
217. Id. at 177–79 (detailing how Southern Sudan citizens have deep distrust for the police and see
little use for courts).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Chesterman, supra note 99, at 83 (detailing the difficulties of administering justice in a
challenging security environment).
221. Bâli, supra note 94, at 445.
222. See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 177 (depicting the problems faced by the
development experts in Southern Sudan when judges could not communicate in English and proved to
be trained predominantly in Sharia law); Chesterman, supra note 99, at 84–86 (discussing the difficulty
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from human resources, rule of law efforts in post-conflict conditions are
hampered by a lack of basic infrastructure and financial resources, as
justice institutions often lack offices, phones, and sufficient salaries.223
This leads to widely asked questions about the sustainability of justice
reforms, especially when donor funds dry up.224 Additionally, there are
problems associated with competing donor agendas and with a lack of
coordination—between agencies involved with police and those involved
with the courts, for example—that are further exacerbated by the postconflict context.225
Perhaps the trickiest and most important problem is legitimacy, which
is particularly difficult to achieve during a foreign occupation following a
war initiated by one of the occupiers, more so if the war was preventive.
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is a recent example of this.226 Many believe
that the occupation was illegal under international law and thus lacked
international and local legitimacy.227 Nor was there a clear mandate under
international law to build a nation and to introduce market liberalization as
the United States has done.228 Additionally, some argue that the United
States took the wrong course of action in Iraq by dismantling the country’s
main state institutions during the first 13 months of occupation, which
created widespread insecurity.229 Such problems of legitimacy are

of finding suitable judges in Timor-Leste after the UN tried to follow a locally-oriented approach to rule
of law building).
223. Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 171–72, 176; Chesterman, supra note 99, at 86.
224. Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 176.
225. Banks, supra note 107, at 161–65.
226. Bâli, supra note 94, at 438 (“Having razed much of Iraq’s state infrastructure to the ground
through bombing campaigns and de-Baathification purges, the U.S. occupation authority may not be
regarded by most Iraqis as a benevolent power to which they are able to transfer the loyalty and
commitment that would be required to instill a new political culture in Iraq.”).
227. Bâli, supra note 94, at 466 (“[T]he invasion and occupation of Iraq are widely seen as illegal
under international law. . . . [T]he United States has consistently ignored the international law of
belligerent occupation . . . . [which] requires an occupying power to retain the status quo with respect to
the legal and political system of the occupied territory, except where modifications are strictly
necessary for reasons of security. . . . [T]he Bush administration made it clear from the outset that these
requirements would not be observed and that an interim constitution would be put in place, designed
precisely to transform the Iraqi legal and political system.”).
228. Id. at 439, 441 (“[T]he establishment of a market economy takes the U.S. reconstruction
strategy in Iraq well beyond any internationally recognized legal authority.”).
229. See id. at 435 (characterizing the U.S. strategy as having “[w]asted the potential political
capital of legitimacy that the United States (and the transitional Iraqi authorities) had initially enjoyed
after the fall of the Baath regime, and [having] squandered a valuable opportunity to lay institutional
foundations for the rule of law in Iraq.”). This echoes insights from UN missions in Kosovo and East
Timor. See Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 60 (2001) (“The United Nations’
most recent experiences in transitional administration demonstrate that justice, and law enforcement
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compounded if the occupying force seeking to build rule of law exempts
itself from the new law’s jurisdiction. For instance, during the occupation,
the United States afforded impunity to its military and civilian personal,
undermining its own nascent rule of law efforts on the ground.230 All of
this raises the question of whether the rule of law can be created under
occupation, especially given the difficulty of developing respect for a law
that lacks legitimacy.231
As with the rule of law, the ultimate problem of limited impact may be
the high level of ambition of post-conflict state-building. Establishing the
rule of law in the name of building a nation and a national identity in postconflict situations is an unfeasible goal that requires long term
“incremental, indigenous, socio-political” processes that, “if at all feasible,
will have to be undertaken autonomously.”232
Some authors have sought recommendations on how to deal with the
many disappointments regarding the impact of post-conflict justice
programs. A key recommendation is to combine state-centered rule of law
building with efforts to engage with local systems and notions of justice
still existent in fragile states.233 The state could serve as a regulator of the
parameters of justice and ensure the accountability of all justice
institutions.234 In addition, reforms would enhance “the voice of the users
and recipients of justice and security services to enable them to be
participants in the delivery of the service they receive.”235 This approach,

more broadly, must be seen as effective from the first days of an operation. The inability to react
swiftly to crime and public unrest, particularly in postconflict situations when criminal activity tends to
increase, and the failure to detain and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can quickly
erode the public’s confidence in the United Nations.”).
230. Bâli, supra note 94, at 467–68.
231. Bâli, supra note 94, at 448; see also Chandler, supra note 93, at 577 (challenging, in the
context of UN rule of law efforts in Bosnia, the idea that “the ‘rule of law’ can be imposed from
outside,” finding that external pressure is undermined by limited legitimacy); id. at 580 (questioning the
international consensus for establishing the rule of law before establishing political processes and
contending that such an approach inherently creates a rule of law that is external to the local politics and
thus without legitimacy and impact).
232. Bâli, supra note 94, at 436–37 (“The ambition and breadth of such projects, frequently
undertaken in the name of such laudable goals as democratization and liberalization, lie at the root of
their failure.”).
233. See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 182 (“A positive step would be for the donorsupported multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations to look beyond its traditional western ‘statebuilding’ model . . . and actively support local justice networks . . . . Such a move would not diminish
the role and function of the state . . . .”); Bâli, supra note 94, at 448 (contending that rule of law in postconflict regions should build on local legal traditions, taking examples from the Arab world in the case
of Iraq).
234. Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 182.
235. Id.
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however, replicates the agenda of powerful colonialists, whereby soft or
indirect support for legal change was used to foster demand for formal
institutions that replicated those of the colonial administration.236
So here again, in response to the criticism of existing practices, highly
thoughtful recommendations have been made that increase the level of
ambition. Not only must law and development build state legal institutions
in the most difficult of circumstances, but it must do so in a bottom-up
manner and while enabling local justice providers.
E. Transitional Justice Challenges
The practice and impact of transitional justice has also received much
scholarly attention. Most critics call for a more comprehensive approach to
transitional justice that would clearly only enhance the level of ambition.
Some positive impacts have been reported.
One empirical
comparative study, using a database of transitional justice processes drawn
from 150 countries over thirty years, measured the impact of three types of
transitional justice: amnesties; prosecutions; and truth commissions on
democratization, rule of law building, and ending violence.237 The findings
show that any transitional justice mechanism improves democracy more
than none at all but that only trials and prosecutions have a positive impact
on rule of law development.238 Claims by advocates that transitional justice
responses lead to peace and reconciliation appear at this point to represent
hopes for a happy ending and not evidence-based politics on which the
international community can count.239
Most other studies question whether transitional justice has the desired
impact and can meet its broad goals.240 Some have even found that some
forms of transitional justice, especially amnesties, have a negative

236. See Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 158 (noting that support of customary law can risk
“authoritarian possibilities” given their vulnerability to manipulation by colonialists and reformers
alike); see also Porter, supra note 179, at 168–71 (noting that there can be an insidious use of legal
pluralism by the “reformer” to manufacture calls for the reform that the reformer wishes to inject or
effect).
237. See Tricia D. Olsen et al., Does Transitional Justice Work? Latin America in Comparative
Perspective, GLOBAL STUD. REV., Fall 2009, http://www.globality-gmu.net/archives/1789.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice:
A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163, 168–69 (2009) (“[T]here is little empirical data to
support the common assumptions that underlie the utility either of criminal trials for alleged
perpetrators or truth and truth/reconciliation commissions.”); Olsen et al., supra note 237 (summarizing
data that indicates that singular post-conflict mechanisms do not work well and that only holistic
approaches are effective for ensuring democracy and human right protection).
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impact,241 as they create popular dissatisfaction and anger when those
responsible for past atrocities are not held legally accountable or when they
receive only relatively minor punishments.242 Transitional justice processes
that focus on restoration without delivering retribution cannot get popular
support from victims,243 who complain that their own trouble making ends
meet stands in stark contrast with the lavish amounts of money spent on
trials and perpetrators.244 Victims often care more for their own pressing
socioeconomic needs, partly made worse by the impact of the atrocities,
and thus for restitutive justice.245 Sierra Leone interviewees “perceived
excombatants as being in a better position to earn a living than amputees,
who in many cases do not have shelter, let alone jobs and a means of
meeting their basic needs.”246 Victims’ geographical remoteness further
undermines legitimacy, as victims are unable to attend trials or commission
hearings, which are often held in major cities or even abroad.247 Thus,
transitional institutions’ key goal to counter the denial of past atrocities
may be undermined, especially where the institutions lack broad
legitimacy.248
Another key legitimacy issue is the unbalanced geopolitical nature of
transitional justice interventions, which have predominantly focused on
non-democratic states in the global south, with only limited attention to
gross human rights violations in democratic Western contexts, such as the
treatment of indigenous populations in Australia, Canada, and the United
States.249 Legitimate transitional justice seems extra difficult in the context

241. Olsen et al., supra note 237.
242. See Lambourne, supra note 110, at 37–38 (interviewing individuals in Timor-Leste, Rwanda,
and Cambodia and finding, for example, that the people of Cambodia petitioned the UN to establish an
international tribunal).
243. Id. at 38.
244. Id. at 42 (“[A Cambodian] genocide survivor asked, ‘Why should the former Khmer Rouge
live so freely and be received . . . in a five-star hotel? This makes a lot of people angry.’”).
245. Id. (“[T]he Tribunal was seen as not responding to the material needs of victims and
witnesses (providing no compensation, restitution, healthcare or other financial assistance).”).
246. Id. at 43.
247. See id. at 40 (describing the remote location of the ICTR and the inability for most Rwandan
victims and survivors to experience the proceedings).
248. Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. Q.
95, 108 (2008) (“Where the legitimacy of transitional justice institutions is successfully challenged, this
undermines their impact in addressing denial [of past atrocities].”); see also Jamie Rowen, Social
Reality and Philosophical Ideals in Transitional Justice, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 93,
116 (2008) (noting that policymakers could fulfill a goal of transitional justice and reach more
individuals by creating and contributing to the community).
249. See Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, 29 THIRD
WORLD Q. 275, 280–81 (noting that, in Western democracies, there are also prevalent instances of
systematic human rights abuses in which justice has been long denied and pointing out that by focusing
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of foreign occupation.250 The United States-organized trial for former Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein is a prime example.251 Problems included
Hussein being denied access to a defense attorney during the first year of
the trial, the murder of three defense attorneys during the trial, and the
forced resignation of a biased judge.252 Furthermore, the trial was
organized at an undisclosed location at a U.S. military base on Iraqi soil,
with unidentified judges, and the defendant was held incommunicado for
months prior to trial, with no public access and limited access for
journalists.253 The trial raises the question of whether “justice” is even
possible in the context of illegitimate and unjustified occupation.254
Meanwhile, many scholars criticize existing transitional justice
practices for not going far enough, arguing that trials, truth commissions,
and amnesties often fail to address the underlying socioeconomic and
cultural causes of conflict and the broader grievances that citizens suffer in
the post-conflict area.255 Scholars claim, for instance, that transitional
justice ignores the impact of conflict and of mass human rights violations
on developmental inequalities and that existing inequalities continue or are
made worse, even following a transitional justice intervention.256 This has
led many transitional justice reforms “to underrate the gendered and
socioeconomic ramifications of violent conflict” and to be “heavily
influenced by the international legalist paradigm, which focuses on
generating elite and mass compliance with international humanitarian

on non-Western developing countries, transitional justice “is vulnerable to the general challenge that
critics raise against the supposed universalism of human rights”).
250. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 327, 359 (2005) (“No norm or precedents exist in international law for
an occupying power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to establish an exceptional national criminal
tribunal.”).
251. See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Iraq: Amnesty International Deplores Death Sentences in
Saddam Hussein Trial (Nov. 5, 2006) (quoting Malcolm Smart), available at http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/asset/MDE14/037/2006/en/0292f7f1-f9d1-11dd-b1b0-c961f7df9c35/mde140372006en.pdf
(“[Saddam Hussein’s] overthrow opened the opportunity to restore this basic right [to a fair trial] and, at
the same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the crimes of the past. It is an opportunity missed . . .
and made worse by the imposition of the death penalty.”); Bâli, supra note 94, at 432–33 (“[T]he
absence of certain procedural protections and the imposition of the death penalty may undermine
transitional justice in Iraq.”).
252. Bâli, supra note 94, at 432–33.
253. Id. at 432.
254. See Nagy, supra note 249, at 279.
255. Id. at 276 (“[P]redominant views [in transitional justice] construct human rights violations
fairly narrowly to the exclusion of structural and gender–based violence.”).
256. See, e.g., id. at 280; RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS
OF WAR 151 (2002) (“[T]he prevalent liberal-democratic ideal . . . tends to favour freedom and liberty
over equality.”).
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norms.”257
Scholars also point to the historical nature of most proceedings, which
pay too little attention to what is happening in the post-conflict era, when
violence often persists or even increases.258 The position of women and
children in these post-conflict situations is particularly worrisome.259 A
fixation on the past also obscures post-conflict justice problems arising
from foreign occupation, which can be detrimental to the legitimacy of
transitional justice.260 Justice issues that arise under military occupation
simply do not fall under the scope of the transitional justice effort, which is
directed at pre-occupation atrocities.261
As with other paradigms, scholars also criticize the limited local
embedment and usage of local knowledge.262
The legal framing
predominant in transitional justice “at times is detrimentally abstracted
from lived realities” and invites the implementation of “one size fits all,
technocratic and decontexualized solutions” that are “[s]teeped in Western
liberalism, and often located outside of the area where conflict
occurred.”263 Any solution proposed in response to such criticism only
further pushes the level of ambition, just as with the other paradigms.
Similar to the critics of the Rule of Law and State-Building paradigms,
scholars call for placing extra priority on an understanding of the local
context and an adaptation of interventions to it264: for instance, by using
local courts and local customary justice institutions, which have better
reach into the local community, instead of international tribunals or
foreign-influenced and newly established domestic courts.265
Practitioners and scholars support a broadened concept of transitional
justice that can, for instance, “integrat[e] social, economic and cultural

257. Nagy, supra note 249, at 278 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. See, e.g., id. at 280.
259. See id.; NAHLA VALJI, UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, A WINDOW OF
OPPORTUNITY?: MAKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE WORK FOR WOMEN 2–3 (2010), available at http://
international-ul.com/pdf/0701_MakingTransitionalJusticeWorkForWomen_en.pdf (arguing for the need
to implement a gender-sensitive transitional justice agenda in order to preclude entrenching the
violation of human rights and perpetuating the marginalization of women).
260. Nagy, supra note 249, at 280.
261. Id.
262. du Plessis & Ford, supra note 111, at 90 (“[E]very country situation is unique, ‘reconciliation’
in particular is something that needs to be defined within the specific cultural context, and so a number
of more general cautions need to be expressed in approaching foreign models and comparative
experience.”).
263. Nagy, supra note 249, at 275–76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See, e.g., Fletcher et al., supra note 240, at 170.
265. See Rowen, supra note 248, at 117.
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rights.”266 More particularly, there is a call to connect previous experience
to reform through using, where possible, local practices to shore up
“accountability, acknowledgement, socioeconomic justice and political
justice.”267 Such an ambitious approach proposes addressing past abuses,
while also seeking to cauterize them.268 Techniques invoked include truth
commissions and war crimes tribunals.269 It is argued that such a integrated
approach might forestall repeats of violence.270 This goal, aspiring to
engineer peace and redress, “implies long-term, sustainable processes
embedded in society and adoption of psychological, political, economic, as
well as legal, perspectives on justice.”271 These ideals require legal
processes to engineer peace and harmony.
If these suggestions are followed, Transitional Justice becomes
Transformative Justice, based on the broadest notion of social, economic,
political, and legal transformation following years or decades of gross
human rights violations, war, state failure, and structural socioeconomic
inequality.272 Of course, in an ideal world in which law and development
has omnipotent knowledge, power, and local legitimacy, these ideas would
form a comprehensive agenda for change that tackles the interrelated
problems. In reality, however, the expansion of the already highly
ambitious transitional justice agenda just does not look feasible and might
even undermine the original restorative and retributive functions of
transitional justice institutions.273 Other, down-to-earth voices point out
that “transitional justice is a long-term process and that a state may only be
adequately prepared years later to take on the challenge of adjudicating
trials or exposing wrong-doing through a truth commission.”274
All of these suggestions mostly point again to a broadening of the
already overburdened law and development paradigm.275 Just as with Rule
266. Duthie, supra note 112, at 303.
267. Lambourne, supra note 110, at 47.
268. See Rama Mani, Editorial, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the
Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 259–60
(2008).
269. Id. at 258.
270. Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST.
331, 355 (2008).
271. Lambourne, supra note 110, at 28.
272. See id. at 45 (advocating for such a model).
273. Duthie, supra note 112, at 306–07 (“Attempts to address . . . development[] may
unrealistically raise and then frustrate expectations of victims and society, or they may simply be a
waste of time and resources.”).
274. Fletcher et al., supra note 240, at 219.
275. But see id. at 170 (stating that one should always first ask “what, whether, and when
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of Law, Bottom-Up Justice, Customary Justice, and State-Building, critics
of the impact of the Transitional Justice paradigm seek to improve it by
broadening its scope and thus paradoxically creating an even higher level
of ambition.
CONCLUSION: AMBITION VS. IMPACT
The consecutive expansion of law and development paradigms has
produced a field that seeks to establish some of the most ambitious forms
of social engineering, aiming not only to build a rule of law that can foster
development but also to change unfavorable local practices that might
undermine such development, doing so amid ethnic conflict and in failed
states. Increasingly, there are questions about and criticism of its ability to
achieve these lofty goals. Surprisingly, instead of lowering its ambitions,
the field has only continued to add to them. Furthermore, the field
consistently refuses to engage with the question of whether there is a moral
rationale for the interference in local regimes by the concerned donor West.
There is not a simple response to these bedrock questions. Arguably,
the answers vary by context and depend on the moral position taken by
reformers to their initiatives. The recipients’ demand for and experience of
aid is consistently underexplored, however, despite the increased
investment in measuring impacts.
The criticism that the law and development project is limited in its
imagination to recasting old approaches and is incapable of moving beyond
the politics of the West and its interests is not new.276 More recently, some
have argued that the development strategy of using “soft law” to shape or
engineer local calls for or responses to legal reforms is reclaiming earlier
strategies used by colonial masters.277 It is also argued that the current
conception of Law and Development involves the West constructing and
using development as a strategy to entrench dependency, although the
mission exhibits Christian faith-based zeal.278 If these arguments are

transitional justice interventions should be initiated”); Duthie, supra note 112, at 306–07 (warning
against unfeasible transitional justice interventions, lest they get caught up in the development paradigm
and in redistribution and socioeconomic rights issues).
276. Upendra Baxi, The Colonialist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 46 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (arguing that the ways in which
comparative law has been constructed serve to entrench Western worldviews and interests and noting
that law and development’s approach to legal reform is not dissimilar to that of myriad colonialists).
277. See Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 158; Porter, supra note 179, at 168–71.
278. See JENNIFER L. BEARD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DESIRE: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NATION STATE (2007) (arguing that the Western notion of development
derives from early Christian notions of sin, salvation, and redemption and ought not to be assumed to
emanate from imperialist traditions).
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accepted, there is no space for law and development other than as a
Western neo-colonial project.
Development as a tool of subjugation is also decried by scholars who
criticize international law as a tool of oppression,279 particularly for its role
in entrenching global poverty. In particular, there is a robust criticism of
international trade norms and practices.280 While there is much rhetoric on
the importance of consultation and the local ownership of aid,281 the seven
paradigms outlined above are almost without exception designed by
outsiders and aspire to see a Western model of law made available to a
broader community. The focus on impact has been at the cost of a focus on
the “demand” side of law and development.282 The politics of aid also
manufactures and entrenches Western self-interest in the export of legal
systems similar to those in donor countries.283 This continues despite the
vulnerability of such exports to criticism arising from the recent global
financial crisis and despite the perceived shortcomings of the institutional
legal matrices of the West.284
279. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1–2 (1999).
280. See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 141–80
(2011) (arguing that the WTO has entenched poverty in developing states and shows no sign of
adopting policies that might redress the imbalance of trade power between developed and developing
states); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 254–62 (2011) (arguing that decolonization produced the
developmental nation-state, which has since become bound by Western states invoking international
law, itself a postcolonial phenomenon); Anne Orford, Beyond Harmonization: Trade, Human Rights,
and the Economy of Sacrifice, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 179, 197–98 (2005) (arguing that trade agreements
demand the sacrifice of public values both in favor of the global market and as the price of inclusion in
the community of believers).
281. See, e.g., Yasutami Shimomura & Izumi Ohno, Introduction and Overview, in TRUE
OWNERSHIP AND POLICY AUTONOMY: MANAGING DONORS AND OWNING POLICIES 1, 2–9 (Izumi Ohno
ed., 2005) (defining ownership to include the capacity to determine aid agendas locally); cf., Kweku
Ampiah, The Discourse of Local Ownership in Development: Rhapsodies About “Self-Help” in Japan’s
Economic Assistance to Africa, 32 JAPANESE STUD. 168, 179 (2012) (noting that “self-help” in Japan is
“more an exhortation than a well-defined and coherent principle”).
282. John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson, Taking the Interpretation of Legal Transfers Seriously: The
Challenge for Law and Development, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF
LEGAL TRANSFERS, supra note 170, at 1, 6 (“Privileging the knowledge and strategies for reform from
the West means less emphasis, if indeed any emphasis, is placed on the demands of aid recipients. The
focus is squarely on the supply side of the aid equation.”).
283. See Frank Schimmelfennig, A Comparison of the Rule of Law Promotion Policies of Major
Western Powers, in RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS: IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 111, 113 (Michael Zürn et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that there are similarities in the rule of
law promotion policies of the United States, the EU, the UK, France, and Germany, each of which
embraces a top-down promotion of the rule of law with an emphasis on
“formal and institutional aspects”).
284. See, e.g., David K. Linnan, The New, New Legal Development Model, in LEGITIMACY, LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED, supra note 86, at 21, 23–24
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Other models of legal development have arisen in the last decade. The
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, for example, advocates a
much more locally-based and locally-developed system of legal
assistance,285 arguably eschewing the Washington consensus.286 The role
that China and Korea will play in the law and development domain over
time is currently unclear, although interest has increased in their activities.
These criticisms exist independently of any criticism premised on
impact and suggest that the sovereignty of nations, particularly those
nations with worldviews (such as socialism or Islamic and other religious
systems of law) that are different from those of Western donors, are
marginalized or coopted.287 These criticisms, which take international law
and development and Western-style law and development as their focus,
have merit. This Article, however, is more concerned with the emergence
of a co-evolutionary pattern in law and development (ambition and
criticism of impact) and calls for a return to a humbler and more locallyowned experience of law in development before anyone decries its very
essence.
Effectively, by combining an ever-growing level of ambition with
increased concern for impact, the field of law and development has become
its own “straw man.” Simply by expanding its promises with each
paradigm and with each expansion within each paradigm, the field has set
itself up for more—ironically, self-inflicted—criticism. At times, the field
seems to have reverted to its 1970s form, leaving scholars within the field
“self-estranged” once again, being both key participants in and chief critics
of the field.288 The notable difference, however, is that this time the
ambitious endeavor has not been stopped by the publication of a single
critical paper289 or even by the virtual tsunami of critical studies that have

(“[P]olicy focus has been shifting toward an ill-defined “post-Washington Consensus,” understood
more in opposition to neoclassical economics and Anglo-American capitalism post 2008 financial
crisis, rather than articulating any clear policy stance.”).
285. Taro Morinaga, Legal Technical Cooperation by Japan: Who We Are and What We Do, ICD
NEWS: LAW FOR DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2010, at 1, 10, available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/
000110665.pdf (“[P]roviding support for legal and judicial reform means to support the efforts
undertaken by developing countries to develop their legal and judicial systems” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
286. Knieper, supra note 171, at 114.
287. See, e.g., Nicholson & Low, supra note 167, at 19, 26 (reporting that actors in the legal
development sector in Vietnam and Cambodia experienced a lack of donor respect for local
sovereignty).
288. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1062–64.
289. See Trubek & Santos, supra note 14 (describing the consequences for the original U.S. Law
and Development movement following the publication of Trubek & Galanter’s paper on selfestrangement).
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come out over the last decade or so. Quite the contrary, there has been an
expansion rather than a retraction of law and development.
To understand this, it is first necessary to look at the relationship
between the ambition and limited impact of law and development.
Ambition and limited impact have acted as co-evolutionary factors. More
ambition has created a demand for demonstrable impact, while mixed
impact evaluations have created a space for scholars and practitioners to
launch new ideas and concepts, which have in turn fostered additional
ambition. Scholars and practitioners have played a double role, supporting
and developing new paradigms while criticizing older ones. This has
created a constant situation of self-estrangement, and yet ironically this
self-estrangement has acted as a catalyst for further activity in the field.
The co-evolution of ambition and limited impact should be understood
both externally and internally to the field of law and development. The
expanded role for law in an expanded concept of development has placed
the once-obscure field of law and development closer to the center of major
national and international political debates, including those over statebuilding, peace-building, good governance, human rights protection,
development cooperation, and economic growth. This means that law and
development in particular and development more generally are no longer
controlled by those inside them but are increasingly subject to external
geopolitical forces. As such, those criticizing law and development’s
limited impact and even its high level of ambition are unable to counter the
broader forces that sustain the paradigms and practices they seek to
criticize. Thus there is growing ambition combined with growing criticism.
Furthermore, the players in the field of law and development have
expanded exponentially over time. This merely adds to the pressures on
the field and renders an implosion, as seen in the 1960s, much less likely.
Today many major multilateral organizations are engaged in the field,
either directly through projects or indirectly through loans.290 In addition,
there are now a host of bilateral donors actively engaged in rule of law,
bottom-up justice, and customary justice activities.291 These new players
290. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4,
at 253, 268; Briefs: Loans and Technical Assistance, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://www.adb.org/news/
briefs (last visited May 29, 2014).
291. See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE,
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE LEGAL FIELD 12–13 (2003) (on file with
authors) (offering a list of JICA supported aid projects); HERBERT KÜPPER, STRUCTURES OF JAPANESE
AND GERMAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CO-OPERATION: WITH FORMERLY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
COMPARED (Nagoya Univ. Ctr. for Asian Legal Exch., CALE Discussion Paper No. 5, 2011), available
at http://cale.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/_userdata/DP%20No.%205.pdf; Nicholson with Pitt, supra note 170,
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are involved across the full spectrum of activities.
As discussed above, many involved in law and development do not
simply criticize but also offer suggestions or recommendations. Those
recommendations introduce extra ambition into the already overburdened
field by broadening existing paradigms and even introducing new ones,
most notably Bottom-Up Justice and Customary Justice.
Such
recommendations are often based on criticism of existing approaches for
their failure to tackle underlying socioeconomic and cultural structures.
And following this analysis, scholars and practitioners thus propose to
move from a formal institutional, legalistic orientation towards a local,
bottom-up, informal, socioeconomic, and cultural orientation. While
external political forces continually demand institutional approaches
oriented towards building highly visible, macro-level, formal institutions,
scholars and practitioners have learned time and again that it is vital to
build upon existing local practices and knowledge. The combination of the
two has created an ugly hybrid that contains the ambitions of both but is
still largely driven by the top-down, quick-working practices of external
politics. This in turn draws more internal criticism and is followed by
another round of recommendations that raise expectations even further.
While, of course, most of the criticisms and suggestions discussed
here are valid and highly important on their own, the overall picture is one
of unbounded ambition and too limited understanding, from those both
outside and inside the field, of the feasibility of law and development
interventions.
Law and development must thus embrace realism, pragmatism, and
humility. If the field continues as it does today, widespread cynicism or
indeed despair will result. Improving the functioning of legal institutions
in developing countries is a “worthy” endeavor that will continue
regardless of doubt, criticism, or theoretical debate. Law and development
can only be undertaken, however, with specific goals and targets in each
collaboration or intervention; broad paradigms or approaches should be
avoided. The political forces external to the field will keep some of the
existing paradigms—most notably Rule of Law, State-Building, and
Transitional Justice—in place for the time being. But scholars and
at 209–19 (listing a range of bilateral donors involved in court-oriented legal reform in Vietnam). On
the motivations that impact donor activity, see Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid
to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33, 33–34 (2000) (arguing that politics and strategic concerns,
rather than economic or policy concerns, explain the targets of donor aid); Peter J. Schraeder et al.,
Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid
Flows, 50 WORLD POL. 294, 319–23 (1998) (arguing that a host of factors, including ideological
alignment and strategic and trade interests but not including humanitarian concerns, influenced
Japanese, French, U.S., Swedish, and Canadian support for foreign aid to Africa during the 1980s).
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practitioners should resist the temptation to put their efforts under these
flags uncritically.
Law and development must not seek to improve the development of
the world by building and expanding major paradigms or by claiming to be
some magical panacea based on correlations of simplistic law and
development indicators. Rather it must adopt a combination of patience,
long-term commitment, and incrementalism, implementing interventions
that have specific and feasible goals and whose impact is checked through
randomized trials and in-depth fieldwork by independent scholars.292
Furthermore, and just as significantly, there is a need to empower the
recipients of aid. The aid “monologue,”293 driven and shaped by the West,
needs to acknowledge the right of countries to determine their own reforms
and to own them locally.294 This may involve a return to technical
assistance alone (albeit reimagined to admit contests of ideas),295 enabling
local stakeholders to debate the shape of their own reform trajectory.
Finally, just as Developmental Economics is arguably being
transformed by the down-to-earth realism of Poor Economics,296 perhaps
Law and Development can turn into a pragmatic and empirically-driven
Poor Justice that does not assume the supremacy of the West and its donors
in development activities and that acknowledges the complex political and
economic landscape into which it presumes to travel.

292. See ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF
WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 14–16 (2011) (arguing that randomized trials should be used to
verify and refine developmental practices).
293. PAUL MUS, LE DESTIN DE L’UNION FRANÇAISE: DE L’INDOCHINE A L’AFRIQUE 53 (1954)
(characterizing the colonial project as a monologue in which the colonial subjects are not engaged).
294. See Gillespie & Nicholson, supra note 282, at 6 (arguing that there is a focus on the supply
side of law and development that marginalizes local recipients).
295. See Newton, supra note 165, at 29–30 (suggesting a critical approach to the role of law could
feature in technical legal assistance).
296. See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 292, at 14–16 (outlining the need for experimental
approaches to development in economics).
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